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"These rules [of evidence] shall be construed to secure fairness ... to the end
that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined."1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) has sparked
considerable interest.' MPD is "a dissociative disorder in which the normally
integrated identity and consciousness functions [of an individual] are suddenly and
temporarily altered."3 In other words, separate and distinct alternative personalities
inhabit one body.4 Over a decade ago, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders included MPD as an official psychiatric diagnosis.5 Since then,
the number of diagnoses have increased dramatically.6 As a result, courts have
2. See Richard P. Kuft, An Update on Multiple Personality Disorder, 38 HOSP. & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY J. 363, 363 (1987).
3. Sarah K. Fields, Multiple Personality Disorder and the Legal System, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 261, 262-63 nn.7-8 (1994).
4. See id. at263 &nn.l0-ll.
5. See Sabra M. Owens, The Multiple Personality Disorder (MPD) Defense, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 237,238 & n.5 (1997). The essential feature of the dissociative disorders is a disruption
in the usually integrated functions of consciousness, memory, identity, or perception of the
environment. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 477 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL]. This
disturbance may be sudden or gradual, transient or chronic. See id. The five disorders included within
this description include Dissociative Amnesia, Dissociative Fugue, Dissociative Identity Disorder
(formerly Multiple Personality Disorder), Depersonalization Disorder, and Dissociative Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified. See id.
6. See Fields, supra note 3, at 264-65 & nn.22-23 (explaining that more than two to three times
as many cases of MPD have been diagnosed in the last twenty years than at any time prior to 1970).
increasingly been faced with witnesses who suffer from the disorder.7 Courts
confronted with a witness with MPD (a "Multiple")' uniformly permit the Multiple
to testify, subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel to impeach the
Multiple's credibility based on his illness.9 These courts take the position that jurors
are best suited to assess the credibility of a Multiple's testimony.'"
Unfortunately, this approach fails to recognize the inherent connection between
hypnosis and MPD." The unrecognized abuse ,of self-hypnosis is the primary
mechanism of MPD.12  Although psychotherapists and medical practitioners
recognize the inherent connection between hypnosis and MPD, the legal system
refuses to acknowledge it. 3 When dealing with hypnosis evidence, courts have
fashioned strict rules regarding its admissibility. 4 Courts uniformly rule that
testimony presented while under hypnosis is per se inadmissible. 5 In addition, many
7. This Article will only focus on testimony from a Multiple who is not a criminal defendant. The
Multiple who is a criminal defendant, like other criminal defendants, has special constitutional rights
that may require the court to permit him to testify. For a discussion of the Multiple as a criminal
defendant, see generally Fields, supra note 3 (arguing that Multiples must reap punishment for their
crimes); Owens, supra note 5 (arguing for a rebuttable presumption of insanity for defendants with
MPD); Elyn R. Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 25 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 383 (1992) (arguing that Multiples are not blameworthy, and therefore, the system should not
punish them); Felicia G. Rubenstein, Note, Committing Crimes While Experiencing a True Dissociative
State: The Multiple Personality Defense andAppropriate Criminal Responsibility, 38 WAYNEL. REV.
353 (1991) (arguing that Multiples should be able to assert insanity defenses in Michigan).
8. Persons diagnosed with MPD are commonly referred to as Multiples. See FRANK W. PUTNAM,
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT OF MULTIPLE PERSONALITY DISORDER 73 (1989).
9. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Thornton v. State, 653
N.E.2d 493,499 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395,
409 (Minn. 1998).
10. See, e.g., Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 227; Thornton, 653 N.E.2d at 497; Wall, 584 N.W.2d at 411.
11. See Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 227 (concluding that "the line of cases holding that statements made
by a person in a hypnotic state are inadmissible does not control the admissibility of the victim's
testimony in a dissociative state"); Wall, 584 N.W.2d at 410-11 (noting that policy arguments counsel
against a per se rule that treats "episodes of dissociation as equivalent to hypnosis").
12. See EUGENEL. BLIss, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, ALLIED DISORDERS, AND HYPNOSIS 117,123-26
(1986) (observing that "[tihere are many converging lines of evidence that support the importance of
self-hypnosis as a major factor" in MPD); PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 218 (tracing the connection
between hypnotic trance states and MPD to the 1800s); Doris Gruenewald, On the Nature of Multiple
Personality: Comparisons with Hypnosis, 32 INT'LJ. CLINICAL& EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 170, 170-
72 (1984) (recognizing that MPD has been historically and conceptually linked with hypnosis). For an
in depth discussion concerning the connection between MPD and hypnosis see infra notes 77-108 and
accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 256-346 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the rules that courts have fashioned regarding the admissibility of hypnosis
evidence see infra notes 139-247 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., People v. Busch, 366 P.2d 314,319-20 (Cal. 1961); Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468,
471 (Ind. 1982); State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909, 924 (Kan. 1985); State v. Conley, 627 P.2d 1174,
1177-78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034 (Md. 1983); People v.
Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508, 521-22
(N.D. 1950); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierce, 207
S.E.2d 414, 418 (S.C. 1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 414, 418 (Va. 1974).
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courts rule that hypnotically refreshed testimony is also per se inadmissible. 6 Courts
confronted with Multiples fail to acknowledge the connection between hypnosis and
MPD, refusing to utilize these hypnosis cases as precedent. Perhaps, courts refuse
because to do so would often result in the exclusion of important testimony.' Some
courts are so bold as to acknowledge that they are admitting a Multiple's testimony
simply because it is the only evidence of a crime. This reasoning sidesteps the key
issue: Is the testimony of a Multiple reliable? If a Multiple's testimony is unreliable,
then the testimony must be excluded, regardless of whether it is the only evidence.
This Article maintains that a Multiple's testimony is a particularly unreliable
form of hypnosis testimony, and therefore should be excluded per se. Part II
examines the connection between MPD and hypnosis." Part III examines the courts'
current approaches to hypnosis testimony.'9 Part IV explains that a Multiple's
testimony is actually testimony given while under hypnosis.2" Part V examines the
courts' current treatment of MPD testimony, illustrating the legal system's refusal to
treat MPD testimony as a form of hypnosis evidence.2' Part VI critiques the courts'
current treatment of MPD testimony.22 Part VII explains why courts should rule that
a Multiple's testimony is a particularly unreliable form of hypnosis testimony which
fails to meet the Frye/Daubert23 tests for scientific evidence, and why the testimony
is always more prejudicial than probative.24 Part VIII provides recommendations to
practitioners and courts regarding how to proceed when confronted with a Multiple.25
Part IX concludes that MPD testimony should be excluded per se.26
16. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1365-66 (Cal. 1982); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d
764, 771 (Minn. 1980); see also infra notes 182-247 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that if testimony
from a Multiple is never admissible, Multiples would be victimized with impunity); Wall v. Fairview
Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 410 (Minn. 1998) (admitting each Multiple's testimony).
The Wall court noted that exclusion of the testimony would allow Multiples' mental states and
vulnerability to become a shield of protection for the offender. See 584 N.W.2d at 410.
18. See infra notes 27-108 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 109-247 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 256-346 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 347-98 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the application of the Frye/Daubert tests for scientific evidence to a
Multiple's testimony see infra Parts LL.A. & VI.A.
24. See infra notes 399-595 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 596-639 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part IX.
II. MPD IS A DISSOCIATIVE DISORDER PERPETUATED BY THE ABUSE OF
SELF-HYPNOSIS
As individuals, each of us "are bundles of contrasts and contradictions."27 On
one occasion we may act child-like and mischievous, while on other occasions we
may act adult-like and dignified. These various aspects of our being have been
described as "roles."28 Although we normally play many roles during our lifetime,
we are typically aware of these roles; we do not "role-play" outside the realm of our
consciousness.29 In other words, we retain awareness of our child-like conduct."a
The same is not true for those suffering from MPD. In a person who has MPD, the
"various personalities are dissociated[;]" they become totally separate and autono-
mous.31 For the Multiple, these autonomous personalities usually operate outside the
realm of consciousness. 32 The Multiple will be unaware of the activities of the
personality, and also may be unaware of the existence of one or more personalities .
The primary mechanism responsible for creating and perpetuating these personalities
is the "unrecognized abuse of self-hypnosis[;]" 4 the key to the dissociative disorder
known as MPD
A. MPD is a Dissociative Disorder
3 6
Dissociation has been defined as a "psychophysiological process whereby
information-incoming, stored, or outgoing-is actively deflected from integration with
its usual or expected associations. 37 While in a dissociative state, a person's
thoughts, feelings or actions are not associated or integrated with other information
27. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 158.
28. See id. at 159 (stating that in normal role-playing, "there is an integration or linkage of various






34. See id. at 125. "The process begins very early in childhood, and thereafter self-hypnosis
becomes the dominant mode of coping with stress." Id. at 125-26. "[M]ultiples are excellent hypnotic
subjects by virtue of years of unrecognized practice as well as a genetic endowment." Id. at 126.
35. See infra notes 77-108 and accompanying text.
36. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL, supra note 5, at 477 (stating that MPD, or
Dissociative Identity Disorder, "is characterized by the presence of two or more distinct identities or
personality states that recurrently take control of the individual's behavior accompanied by an inability
to recall important personal information that is too extensive to be explained by ordinary
forgetfulness"); Richard P. Kluft, The Dissociative Disorders, in TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 557,569-
79 (J.A. Talbot et al. eds., 1988).
37. Louis J. West, Dissociative Reactions, in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 890, 890
(A.M. Freedman & H.I. Kaplan eds., 1967).
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as they normally or logically would be.35 In otherwords, dissociation affects the way
that experiences are perceived and stored in memory. Dissociation can be either
minor and non-pathological, or major and pathological.39
One example of minor, non-pathological dissociation is common daydreaming."
Each of us can recall times when we were so absorbed in daydreaming that we did
not hear the doorbell, the telephone, or a statement made by a companion. Such
daydreaming is a form of minor, non-pathological dissociation.41 Another example
of minor non-pathological dissociation is "highway hypnosis."42 We each have had
experiences when driving seemed to be "automatic." In other words, we were not
really concentrating on our driving-we may even have been daydreaming-but we
nevertheless obeyed all traffic rules and arrived safely at our destination with little,
if any, memory of how we got there or what occurred along the way. On these
occasions, the car seemed to drive on its own. During such a trip, we most likely
were experiencing minor, non-pathological dissociation.
When individuals are in dissociative states, common experiences such as hearing
a telephone ring or stopping at a traffic light are not perceived and stored in memory
as they normally would be.43 These experiences do not become associated or
integrated with other information that individuals are processing." Although
dissociation can be minor and non-pathological, as in the examples above,
dissociation can also be severe and pathological in nature.45
Experts have identified three principles that may be used to characterize most
forms of severe, pathological dissociation.46 Each of these principles apply to an
individual with MPD, which is referred to as the ultimate pathological dissociative
disorder. First, a person undergoing severe, pathological dissociation "experiences
an alteration in his or her sense of identity. '47 This alteration may take different
forms, ranging from amnesia to "the existence of a series of alternating identities that
claim independence from one another."48 This alteration of identity is present in a
Multiple. A Multiple has a series of alternating personalities that dissociate and




42. See id. at 10.
43. See id. at 7 (explaining that there will be a disturbance in the individual's memory for events
occurring during a period of dissociation).
44. See id. at 6.
45. See id. at 6-7.
46. See id. (stating that the first two principles were identified by John Nemiah and that the third
principle emerged from Dr. Putnam's study of dissociative reactions).
47. See id. at 6.
48. See id. at 6-7.
become "totally separated as autonomous components."49 One particularly important
autonomous component of the MPD personality system is the alter personality who
serves as the "host." The host is the personality in charge of the body the majority
of time.5" In the alternative, "the host may not always be a single alter personality,"
but could be "a social facade created by a... cooperative effort of several alters
agreeing to pass as one."'" "Hosts are often overwhelmed by their life circumstances
and present themselves as powerless and at the mercy of forces beyond their control
and comprehension."52 Hence, "[t]he typical host personality is depressed, anxious,
anhedonic, rigid, frigid, compulsively good, conscience-stricken, and masochistic.
"53
There are other broad categories of alter personalities that are common in
Multiples. For instance, there are child personalities,54 suicidal personalities,55
protector and helper personalities,56 memory trace personalities,57 cross-gender
personalities,5 promiscuous personalities,59 administrator and obsessive-compulsive
personalities,' substance-abuser personalities,6 autistic and handicapped personali-
ties,62 special skill or talent personalities,63 anesthetic or analgesic personalities,'
imitator and imposter personalities,65 demon and spirit personalities,' and original
personalities.67 Further, "[p]ersonalities may have different perceptions, recollec-
tions, priorities, goals, and degrees of commitment to... one another."
68
The second characteristic of severe pathological dissociation is "a disturbance
in the individual's memory for events occurring during [the] period of dissociation.
This disturbance of memory may range from complete amnesia to forms of detached
or dreamlike recall of events."'69 This disturbance in memory is also present in a
49. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 159.




54. See id. at 107-08. The number of child personalities typically outnumber the number of adult
personalities. See id. at 107. Child and infant personalities remain at a particular age until relieved of
their psychological burden. See id.
55. See id. at 109.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 110.
58. See id. at 110-11.
59. See id. at 111.
60. See id.
61. Seeid. at 112.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 112-13.
64. See id. at 113.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 113-14.
67. See id. at 114.
68. Kluft, supra note 2, at 370 (recognizing that the personalities must "gradually arrive at a unity
of purpose and a common motivation for therapy to succeed").
69. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 7.
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Multiple. In fact, in a Multiple, the host often does not know about the existence of
other alter personalities, and cannot account for the loss of time when other alters
were active.7°
Third, research has established that the vast majority of pathological dissociative
disorders are induced by trauma.7 MPD is no exception. MPD frequently occurs in
persons who have experienced severe trauma, including sexual abuse.72 In fact,
"there is strong evidence linking the development of MPD to severe, recurrent
traumatic experiences usually occurring during childhood or early adolescence."73
For these individuals, "dissociation is a normal process that is initially used
defensively by [the] individual to handle traumatic experiences and evolves.., into
a maladaptive or pathological [disorder.]"74
Thus, each characteristic of severe, pathological dissociative disorders is present
in a Multiple. Indeed, MPD is recognized as the ultimate pathological dissociative
disorder.75 However, it is not enough to merely characterize a Multiple as having a
severe, pathological disorder. One must also recognize that the primary mechanism
of the disorder is the abuse of self-hypnosis.76
B. Self-Hypnosis is the Primary Mechanism for MPD
Self-hypnosis is the primary mechanism for dissociation in MPD patients.77 In
fact, MPD is historically and conceptually linked with hypnosis. 78 The syndrome of
MPD usually begins in early childhood, as a defense against physical, sexual, or
70. See id. at 107.
71. See id. at 7.
72. See id. at 8.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
75. See id. at 26.
76. For further discussion of a Multiple's unrecognized abuse of self-hypnosis see infra notes 77-
108 and accompanying text; see also BLISS, supra note 12, at 117-25 (discussing the role of self-
hypnosis in MPD); Eugene L. Bliss, A Symptom Profile of Patients with Multiple Personalities
Including MMPI Results, 172 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 197-202 (1984) (same); Eugene L.
Bliss, Multiple Personalities: A Report of 14 Cases with Implicationsfor Schizophrenia and Hysteria,
37 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1388-97 (1980) [hereinafter Bliss, Report of 14 Cases] (same);
Bennett G. Braun, Uses of Hypnosis with Multiple Personality, 14 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 34-40 (1984)
(same); Richard P. Kluft, Varieties of Hypnotic Interventions in the Treatment of Multiple Personality,
24 AM. J. CLINICAL HYPNOSiS 230-40 (1982) (same); J.P. Sutcliffe & Jean Jones, Personal Identity,
Multiple Personality and Hypnosis, 10 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 231-69 (1962)
(same).
77. See BLISs, supra note 12, at 125-26.
78. See sources cited supra note 12.
psychological abuse.79 Unpleasant or traumatic experiences are "delegated to a
personality by the switch into a hypnotic state.""0 Hypnotic dissociation can play an
important role for individuals dealing with stress and trauma."1 For example,
hypnosis can help resolve seemingly irreconcilable conflicts, isolate catastrophic
experiences, and facilitate the discharge of certain feelings.8 2 This delegation of
traumatic experiences to an alter personality allows the patient to forget the
experience.8 3 A hypnotized individual experiences dissociation." In the case of
MPD, self-hypnosis is abused, producing amnesias and alter personalities; the alter
personalities are then perpetuated by the process of self-hypnosis. 5 Although the
process begins in early childhood, self-hypnosis ultimately becomes the Multiple's
dominant mode for coping with stress.86 Thus, the crux of MPD is the Multiple's
"unrecognized abuse of self-hypnosis."87
All Multiples are excellent hypnotic subjects with unusual hypnotic abilities.88
There are several conditions that can provoke spontaneous hypnosis in excellent
hypnotic subjects. For example, an excellent hypnotic subject may experience a
hypnotic trance by reaching a certain level of "boredom, relaxation, play, [or]
reflection."89 Hypnotic trances are also produced by "strong emotions such as fear,
anxiety, rage, and panic," often in response to some psychological or physical
threat.' A Multiple spontaneously transforms or "switches" into an alter personality
when he "encounters a stress with which he... cannot cope."'" When a Multiple
switches into an alter personality, the transformation is accomplished through
hypnosis.92
Most Multiples receiving psychotherapy explain that the patient "disappears"
when the alter personality assumes the body.93 Although the transformation or switch
to an alter personality is usually rapid, occasionally a person observing the Multiple
79. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 8.
80. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 126.
81. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 11.
82. See A.M. Ludwig et al., The Objective Study of a Multiple Personality: Or Are Four Heads
Better Than One, ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 93 (1972).
83. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 125-26.
84. See Gruenewald, supra note 12, at 172. Hypnotically induced dissociation with a hypnotist,
even if experienced as involuntary, is artificial and readily reversible whereas MPD dissociation,
artificial at first, becomes real by virtue of being repeatedly enacted and reinforced. See id. In other
words, the dissociation is, initially, a normal defense process to handle traumatic experiences. See id.
However, when it is repeatedly reenacted and reinforced over time, it evolves into the maladaptive or
pathological disorder known as MPD. See id.
85. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 125-26.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 125.
88. See id. at 123; PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 9-11.
89. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 71.
90. See id. (adding that "drugs and alcohol may facilitate the process").
91. See id. at 125.
92. See id. at 123-26.
93. See id. at 138-39.
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will witness a momentary pause or "blank state."94 In other words, Multiples self-
hypnotize, go into a dissociative state, disappear, and are "replaced" by alter
personalities. 95 Not only do Multiples frequently enter these dissociated states, but
most Multiples spend inordinate amounts of their lives in dissociative states as alter
personalities.'
A Multiple's recognition of alter personalities is variable; some are known to the
Multiple, others are completely out of his awareness. 97 "Many personalities know
information that is inaccessible to the [host personality.]"" The reason for this is that
the information has been "split off from normal consciousness and hidden hypnoti-
cally." 99 Often, Multiples internalize and hypnotically conceal traumatic memories,
delegating them to alter personalities, thereby creating a protective amnesia."°
Although personalities are created by the Multiple using self-hypnosis, once
created, they "continue to exist but are hidden from consciousness."' ' "Some
[personalities] may never appear but will periodically influence the [Multiple's]
conscious behavior."'0 2 Other personalities assume control "and in full conscious-
ness perform their functions."'0 3 All personalities that appear are "partially or
completely divorced from judgment, moral mandates, and other factors in memory
that ordinarily would function."" 4
The key to understanding MPD is to focus on the disorder's ultimate mechanism,
namely, self-hypnosis. 10 5 Self-hypnosis and its resulting amnesia "can not only hide
traumas and personalities from consciousness; it can also conceal motor movements,
bodily sensations, fantasies, language, vision, audition.., any capability recorded
in short- or long-term memory.""' MPD is the "best example of spontaneous self-
94. See id. at 139; see also PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 120-21 (noting that "[tihe actual moment of
switching can last from fractions of a second to several minutes or even longer").
95. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 125, 138-39.
96. See id. at 125.
97. See id. at 140-41; see also PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 114 (stating that "[s]ome types of
personalities, such as ... memory trace alters, will claim knowledge of the entire system of alter
personalities," while other alters may know only a subset of personalities).
98. BLISS, supra note 12, at 141.
99. See id. at 142.
100. See id. at 143.
101. See id. at147-48. "One of the major tasks of therapy is to make available to the entire system
of personalities the knowledge and secrets held by specific alter personalities. This generalization of
knowledge gradually erodes the need for separateness and begins the movement toward resolution."
PtJrNAM, supra note 8, at 115.
102. BLISS, supra note 12, at 148.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 163.
106. See id.
hypnosis" in existence."7 MPD "demonstrat[es] the ability of hypnosis to produce
a galaxy of symptoms, personalities, and irrational behaviors.""1 8 Unless courts
understand the effects of self-hypnosis, and recognize that it is the key mechanism
of MPD, they will never understand the disorder and its effects on a Multiple's
testimony.
I1. COURTS' TREATMENT OF HYPNOSIS TESTIMONY
Hypnosis testimony is divided into two main types. The first type is testimony
given while in an actual hypnotic state."° The second type, hypnotically refreshed
testimony, does not refer to statements made by a witness while under hypnosis.
Instead, it refers to the witness's present recollection of events that took place prior
to hypnosis, but which have been refreshed or recalled by hypnosis. "0 Regardless
of which type of hypnotic testimony is at issue, when addressing its admissibility, the
threshold question for the courts is whether the standards for scientific evidence
apply to hypnosis testimony."' An overwhelming majority of courts answer this
question in the affirmative. "2
Courts confronted with hypnosis testimony, regardless of whether they apply the
standards for scientific evidence, adopt one of four approaches with respect to the
admissibility of the testimony. These four approaches are: (1) a "credibility"
approach;" 3 (2) a "discretionary admission" approach;".4 (3) a "procedural safe-
107. See id. at 117-19 (discussing the development and origins of MPD).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., People v. Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d 539,543-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
"evidence of a subject's responses while under hypnosis is inadmissible").
110. See, e.g., State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909, 924 (Kan. 1985) (defining hypnotically refreshed
testimony not as "the actual statements made by the witness while under hypnosis, but the witness's
present recollection which had been refreshed by hypnosis").
111. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 490 (N.Y. 1983) (noting that "[alt the center of
the controversy is the question as to whether the general rule governing admissibility of scientific
evidence applies to hypnotic recall"); see also People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1366 (Cal. 1982)
(recognizing that the correct analysis of the problem is to determine whether hypnotically recalled
testimony is subject to the Frye rule, and if so, whether it meets the test of that rule); State v. Tuttle, 780
P.2d 1203, 1210 (Utah 1989) (stating that the Frye test is the threshold reliability test for hypnosis
testimony).
112. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc);
Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1366; Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330, 340 (Fla. 1984); People v. Gonzales, 329
N.W.2d 743,748 (Mich. 1980); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648, 654 (Neb. 1981); State v. Hurd, 432
A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 1981); Hughes, 453 N.E.2d at 490. At least one court has ruled that the standards
for scientific evidence do not apply to hypnosis testimony at all. See Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597,
610 (2d Cir. 1995).
113. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
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guards" approach;"' and (4) a "per se inadmissible" approach."' Courts adopting
one of the first three approaches examine hypnosis testimony on a case-by-case
basis." 7 Courts following the "per se inadmissible" approach have determined that
a case-by-case assessment is unnecessary because hypnosis testimony is unreliable,
and must be excluded." 1
8
A. Whether the Evidentiary Standards for Scientific Evidence Apply to
Hypnosis Testimony
Courts confronted with hypnosis testimony must determine whether the analysis
includes the evidentiary standards for scientific evidence. Most courts have ruled
that the scientific standards apply to hypnosis testimony. 9 The "general acceptance"
standard for scientific evidence was espoused more than seventy years ago in Frye
v. United States.20 This standard requires that in order for scientific evidence to be
admissible, "the results of mechanical or scientific testing [must be] developed or
improved to the point where experts in the field widely share the view that the results
are scientifically reliable as accurate."' 121 "[WIhere the science is new, controversial,
or close to the frontier of understanding, the proponent must show the proffered
115. See infra notes 158-67 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 168-247 and accompanying text. See generally Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence in U.S. Courts, 43 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS
212 (1995) (explaining that the diversity in case law has resulted from a judicial failure to understand
the scientific research on hypnosis).
117. See, e.g., People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1016 (Colo. 1987) (stating that trial courts must
make a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether hypnosis testimony qualifies for admission).
118. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129,137-38 (Alaska 1986) (recognizing that a "case-by-
case approach is time consuming, creates a risk of non-uniform results and requires judges to become
hypnosis experts").
119. For a list of cases that have ruled that the scientific standards apply to hypnotic testimony, see
supra note 112.
120. See 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). The court stated that:
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and
while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id.
121. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980); Frye, 293 F. at 1013; see also
Campbell Perry et al., Rethinking Per Se Exclusions of Hypnotically Elicited Recall as Legal
Testimony, 44 INT'L J. CLINIcAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOsIs 66, 72 (1996) (quoting Mack for the
proposition that the scientific principle must have gained general acceptance in its particular field in
order to be admissible).
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evidence is valid science."' 22 Under Frye, the threshold question of admissibility is
whether the scientific evidence is reliable.'23 Frye ensures the reliability of scientific
evidence by using the scientific community as a "technical jury."'124 However, a
number of courts'25 have abandoned the Frye test since the 1993 United States
Supreme Court decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 126
In place of Frye, the Daubert Court substituted a relevance-reliability test.
127
According to the Daubert Court, this test is derived from Federal Rule of Evidence
702 which governs the admissibility of expert testimony. 128 Rule 702 requires that
an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific knowledge."'129 Thus, in application of
this standard, courts should consider:
(a) whether a scientific technique has been tested, (b) whether a technique has been
subjected to the peer review and publication process, (c) a technique's known or
potential rate of error, (d) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling a
technique's operation, and (e) whether a technique has achieved general acceptance.13
0
The Supreme Court emphasized that the Rule 702 standard is a more liberal,
"flexible one" that goes beyond Frye's "general acceptance" criterion by considering
the factors discussed above.' 3 ' Further, it is important to note that Daubert rests on
an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence which are statutory, and thus, only
bind federal courts. 32 Therefore, states still have the freedom to adopt or reject the
Daubert and Frye tests. There are four reasons why states have adopted the
122. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 7.8, at 741-42 (1995).
123. See generally Michael J. Shehab, Note, The Future of the Davis-Frye Test in Michigan:
Rumors of its Demise Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 113, 115 (1996)
(recognizing that reliability is ensured by requiring that the scientific procedures used to gather and
analyze the evidence are viewed as acceptable practices within the general scientific community). To
apply Frye, courts confronted with a proffer of scientific evidence make a preliminary assessment of
the evidence through the introduction of other evidence regarding: (1) the status of the evidence in the
appropriate scientific community; (2) the technique used; and (3) the application of the technique. See
id.
124. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, 15 CARDoZO L.
REV. 1999, 2019 (1994). Experts in the scientific community form a kind of "technical jury" who must
first pass on the scientific status of a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of
fact. See id.
125. See PAUL C. GIANNELLI & E.J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIIC EVIDENCE § 1-5, at 14 n.56 (1986
& Supp. 1991) (providing a list of cases abandoning the Frye test).
126. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
127. See id. at 589 ("[T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence
admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.").
128. See id. at 589-90 (recognizing that Rule 702 contemplates some degree of regulation of the
subjects and theories about which an expert may testify). The Daubert Court noted that the expert's
testimony must be comprised of scientific knowledge. See id.
129. See id. at 590.
130. Giannelli, supra note 116, at 218.
131. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; Perry et al., supra note 121, at 78.
132. See Giannelli, supra note 116, at 218.
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Frye/Daubert standard: (1) the standard is judicially manageable; (2) the standard
saves judicial time and resources; (3) the standard assures that juries will not be
misled by unproven, unsound "scientific" procedures, thus safeguarding the court's




The vast majority of courts considering whether the evidentiary standards of
scientific evidence apply to hypnosis testimony adopt Frye.3 4 These courts hold that
scientific technique is involved when a lay witness presents hypnosis testimony.
135
According to these courts, the Frye standard must apply because the hypnotically
enhanced testimony is the product of scientific intervention. 136 Courts that adopt the
Frye standard for hypnosis testimony agree that the standard must be applied because
the witness's testimony is "dependent upon, and cannot be [divorced] from, the
underlying scientific technique" of hypnosis that helped shape it.137 Most cases adopt
133. See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986) (explaining why the Frye/Daubert
standards are appropriate when reviewing the admissibility of scientific evidence).
134. See, e.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1272 (Ariz. 1982) (en banc)
(stating that hypnotic inducement is not reliable); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1366 (Cal. 1982)
(aligning with other jurisdictions in holding that hypnotically induced testimony is unreliable); People
v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710, 711 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that hypnotically induced testimony is
per se invalid); People v. Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Mich. 1980) (stating that testimony that
results from hypnosis is inadmissible); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Neb. 1981) (barring
hypnosis testimony until it gains more acceptance); People v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 490 (N.Y.
1983) (stating that knowledge about hypnosis is in flux). For a discussion of why the Frye standard for
scientific evidence should also apply to the testimony of a Multiple see infra notes 414-22 and
accompanying text.
135. See supra note 134 (listing cases that have adopted Frye to determine the admissibility of
scientific evidence). At least two courts have held that Frye is inapplicable to hypnosis testimony,
arguing that Frye only concerns the admissibility of data derived from scientific techniques or expert
opinions. See Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d
1196, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1984). These courts said that the issue confronting them when dealing with
witnesses testifying under hypnosis or witnesses who have had recollection refreshed by hypnosis, is
whether the witnesses are competent or whether their lay testimony is admissible. See Borawick, 68
F.3d at 610; Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1201. Under either characterization, these courts have noted that the
question does not concern the admissibility of experimental data or expert opinions, therefore Frye does
not apply. See Borawick, 68 F.3d at 610; Valdez, 722 F.2d at 1200-01.
136. See, e.g., Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1372 (stating that the testimony is dependent upon scientific
technique); Polk v. State, 427 A.2d 1041, 1048 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (same); Gonzales, 329
N.W.2d at 746 (same); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823, 828-29 (Mo. 1985) (same); Hughes, 453
N.E.2d at 494 (same); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 1211 (Utah 1989) (same). No court has used the
Daubert standard to address this issue, however, because the Daubert standard also requires general
acceptance in the scientific community it is probable that these courts' holdings would remain
unchanged.
137. See, e.g., Shirley, 723 P.2d at 1372 (finding "[tihe technique of hypnosis is scientific, but the
testimony... of the witness is the... product of the administration of the technique"); Polk, 427 A.2d
at 1048 (same); Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d at 746 (same); Alsbach, 700 S.W.2d at 828-29 (same); Hughes,
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this standard for hypnosis testimony treat the testimony as inadmissible per se.'
B. Four Alternative Approaches to Hypnosis Testimony Used by State and
Federal Courts
1. The Credibility Approach
One approach used by courts when confronted with hypnotically refreshed
testimony is the credibility approach. Courts following this approach find that
hypnotically refreshed testimony affects the credibility of the testimony, but not its
admissibility.'39 Thus, a witness's hypnotically refreshed testimony is admitted,
leaving the credibility of the witness for the jury to determine. 4 ' This approach is
exemplified by the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Adams. 4'
In Adams, the defendants were convicted for conspiracy, assault with intent to
rob, robbery, and murder.' During investigation of these crimes, an eyewitness to
the murder was hypnotized by postal investigators to aid his ability to recall the
events of the crime. 43 At trial, the defendants unsuccessfully moved to have the
witness's testimony limited to his pre-hypnosis statements.'" The defense called the
same eyewitness to the stand. On cross-examination, the prosecution was able to
discredit the eyewitness's testimony with statements he made after undergoing
hypnosis."'
On appeal, Adams argued that all of the eyewitness's in-court testimony should
be excluded on the grounds that testiiony from a witness who had been hypnotized
453 N.E.2d at 494 (finding that hypnosis "is a scientific process and the recollections it generates must
be considered as scientific results"); Tuttle, 780 P.2d at 1211 (recognizing that "hypnotically enhanced
testimony given by the witness is the product of scientific intervention").
138. See, e.g., People v. Busch, 366 P.2d 314,319-20 (Cal. 1961); Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468,
471 (Ind. 1982); State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909, 924 (Kan. 1985); State v. Conley, 627 P.2d 1174,
1177-78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d 1028, 1034 (Md. 1983); People v.
Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508, 522 (N.D.
1950); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierce, 207 S.E.2d 414,
418 (S.C. 1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Va. 1974).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Awkward, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir. 1978); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th
Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509 (9th Cir. 1974).
140. See Giannelli, supra note 116, at 224 (noting both federal and state court decisions which have
followed the credibility approach). However, these early cases arose before courts viewed hypnotically
refreshed testimony with skepticism and questioned its reliability. See id.
141. 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1978).
142. See id. at 195-96.
143. See id. at 198.
144. See id.
145. See id.
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was unreliable.'" The court of appeals held that the hypnotically refreshed testimony
was admissible and that its reliability was a question for the jury.'47 Therefore, the
appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the
testimony.'n
2. The Discretionary Admission Approach
The discretionary admission approach recognizes ajudge' s discretion to exclude
hypnotically refreshed testimony if it is found to be unreliable in a particular case. 49
Most courts using this approach apply a "totality of the circumstances" analysis. 50
The Second Circuit recently followed this approach in Borawick v. Shay.5'
In Borawick, the plaintiff filed a tort action against her aunt and uncle for alleged
sexual abuse that occurred when she was a child.'52 The court addressed the
admissibility of memories of childhood sexual abuse recallea for the first time in
adulthood as a result of hypnosis administered as part of a general psychotherapy
session.'53 The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants,
following an in limine ruling prohibiting the plaintiff from testifying based on
hypnotically refreshed recollections of sexual abuse."5
On appeal, the court suggested that inflexible per se exclusion approaches often
exclude reliable testimony, therefore, the court adopted a "totality of the circum-
stances" approach.'55 In determining whether hypnotically refreshed testimony
should be admissible, the court provided a nonexclusive list of factors that may be
weighed on a case-by-case basis in assessing whether testimony is sufficiently
reliable and whether its probative value outweighs any prejudicial effect. 56 As a
146. See id. at 199.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 200.
149. See, e.g., Barnes v. Henderson, 725 F. Supp. 142, 147 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 923 F.2d 843
(2d Cir. 1990); Chamblee v. State, 527 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988); People v. Romero, 745
P.2d 1003, 1016 (Colo. 1987); State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 578 (Idaho 1984); People v. Lee, 537
N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 827 (Miss. 1984); State v.
Hutchinson, 661 P.2d 1315, 1320 (N.M. 1983); State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d 898, 905 (Ohio 1988);
Zani v. State, 767 S.W.2d 825,838 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386, 394
(Wis. 1983).
150. See cases cited supra note 149.
151. 68 F.3d 597, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1995).
152. See id. at 598.
153. See id. at 600.
154. See id. at 598.
155. See id. at 607-08.
156. See id. at 608. These factors resemble the procedural safeguards presented in State v. Hurd, 432
A.2d 86, 96-97 (N.J. 1981). However, the "totality of the circumstances" factors are less refined and
not mandatory. The factors include: (1) whether the refreshed memory concerns a known public event
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result, the court of appeals held that Borawick' s hypnotically refreshed testimony was
inadmissible under the totality of circumstances. 
157
3. The Procedural Safeguards Approach
The third approach used by courts when confronted with hypnotically refreshed
testimony is to admit the testimony if certain procedural safeguards are met.'58 The
-leading case on point, decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1981, is State v.
Hurd.'59 The issue before the Hurd court was whether the testimony of a witness
who had undergone hypnosis to refresh her recollection was admissible in a criminal
trial, and if so, under what circumstances.'" The trial court held that the hypnotically
refreshed testimony was inadmissible. 6' Moreover, the court affirmed the trial
court's decision, and adopted a two-part test for admissibility.'62
The first part of the two-part test adopted by the court is whether the testimony
meets the following procedural safeguards:'63
First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must
conduct the hypnotic session. Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic
session should be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor,
investigator or defense. Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law
enforcement personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded,
either in writing or another suitable form. Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the
hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the
subject remembers them. Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject
must be recorded. Finally, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present
experienced by the subject or whether the memory is refreshed as a result of therapy; (2) whether, before
or during the hypnosis, the hypnotist made any extraneous suggestions regarding the subject matter of
the hypnosis which may have become part of the witness's memory; (3) the presence or absence of a
permanent record of the hypnosis sessions to ascertain whether the hypnotist used reliable procedures;
(4) the qualifications of the hypnotist; (5) whether any corroborating evidence tends to support the
reliability of the testimony; (6) the subject's ability to be hypnotized; (7) whether any expert evidence
was presented by the parties regarding the reliability of the procedures used by the hypnotist; and (8)
the court should hold a pretrial hearing to enable the parties to present expert evidence and to test
credibility through cross-examination. See Kristy L. Topham, Note, Borawick v. Shay: The
Admissibility of Hypnotically-Induced Memories, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 423, 444-45 (1997).
157. See Borawick, 68 F.3d at 609. The court found that the hypnotist was not qualified, the record
lacked any basis to assess the reliability of his procedures, and there was no permanent record of the
hypnosis session. See id.
158. See, e.g., Hurd, 432 A.2d at 89-90; State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618, 624 (S.D. 1988).
159. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
160. See id. at 88.
161. See id. at 89-90.
162. See id. at 96-98. Prior to applying this two-part test for admissibility, the New Jersey Supreme
Court also noted that hypnotically refreshed testimony must satisfy the Frye standard for admissibility
of scientific evidence. See id. at 91.
163. See id. at 96-97. The court prescribed these safeguards based on the opinions of Dr. Martin T.
Ome, a noted hypnosis expert and psychiatrist. See id.
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during any phase of the hypnotic session, including the prehypnotic session, the
prehypnotic testing and the post hypnotic interview.' 64
The second portion of the court's two-part admissibility test requires that the
state meet the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that it
complied with these procedural safeguards. 6 Applying the two-part test to this case,
the court found that the state failed to satisfy the procedural safeguards, and that the
psychiatrist and law enforcement personnel exerted pressure on the witness inducing
her to identify the defendant. 16   Although the court recognized that hypnotic
testimony was inadmissible in Hurd, it acknowledged that such testimony would be
admissible in other cases if the procedural safeguards were satisfied. 1
67
4. The Per Se Rule of Exclusion Approach
The final approach used by courts for hypnosis testimony is the per se rule of
exclusion approach. This approach is used both for testimony while under hypnosis
and for hypnotically refreshed testimony.
a. Per Se Exclusion of Testimony While Under Hypnosis
Courts are in agreement that testimony while under hypnosis and evidence of
what a subject says while under hypnosis are inadmissible per se.168 Particularly, in
People v. Hangsleben,'69 the court disallowed evidence of a subject's responses while
under hypnosis, ruling that the testimony was unreliable. 7 ° The defendant in
Hangsleben was a teenage boy convicted of two counts of second degree murder for
the slaying of two young girls in their home.' 7' After the murders, the defendant had
several contacts with the police, and made several incriminating admissions to
them.'72 For instance, although he denied killing the girls, the defendant admitted to
164. Id.
165. See id. at 97.
166. See id. at 98.
167. See id. at 88.
168. See, e.g., People v. Busch, 366 P.2d 314, 319-20 (Cal. 1961); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330,
340 (Fla. 1984); Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468,472 (Ind. 1982); State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909,924
(Kan. 1985); State v. Conley, 627 P.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d
1028, 1034 (Md. 1983); People v. Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State
v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508, 521-22 (N.D. 1950); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Okla. Crim. App.
1975); State v. Pierce, 207 S.E.2d 414,418 (S.C. 1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 204 S.E.2d 414,
419 (Va. 1974).
169. 273 N.W.2d 539 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
170. See id. at 543-44.
171. Seeid. at540.
172. See id.
being in their home the night of the murders.173 When speaking to the police, the
defendant claimed that he could not remember what occurred at the girls' home.'74
At trial, however, he allegedly remembered that a third person was present and
committed the crimes.'75 Defense counsel was denied their request to have the
psychiatrist who examined the defendant after his arrest testify regarding statements
made by the defendant while under hypnosis, and to play a tape of the conversation
between the psychiatrist and the defendant.'76
The defendant raised several supposed errors by the trial court, including the
court's decision on the admissibility of evidence obtained by examining the
defendant while under hypnosis.'77 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the
testimony was inadmissible and affirmed the trial court's decision.'78
The Hangsleben court reasoned that one purpose for introducing this testimony
would be to establish the truth of the statements made by the defendant while he was
under the hypnotic trance. A second use.., would be to bolster the credibility of
[the] defendant's story at trial by arguing that the hypnosis had a mind-jogging effect,
which would help explain defendant's earlier inconsistent admissions to police.79
The court held, as a matter of first impression, that "evidence of [a] subject's
responses while under hypnosis is inadmissible for either of these purposes."' 0 In
addition, the court recognized that "[c]ourts in other jurisdictions have universally
disallowed" such testimony when offered to establish the truth of the statements
made by a witness while under hypnosis, reasoning that such testimony is
unreliable.' 8'
b. Per Se Exclusion of Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
Courts have also adopted a rule of per se exclusion regarding hypnotically
refreshed testimony. Courts adopting this approach do so using different legal
arguments. The two most prominent arguments are that the testimony fails to meet




176. See id. at 543.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 543-44.
179. See id. at 543.
180. See id. at 543-44. The court noted that the hypnosis testimony was unreliable. See id. at 544.
The defendant's sole assertion of reliability was that the psychiatrist who administered the test was
qualified, however, the court ruled that this was inadequate foundation for the scientific evidence. See
id.
181. Seeid. at544.
182. See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1372 (Cal. 1982); People v. Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d
743, 748 (Mich. 1982); Alsbach v. Bader, 700 S.W.2d 823, 829 (Mo. 1985); People v. Hughes, 453
N.E.2d 484, 494 (N.Y. 1983).
183. See, e.g., Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 137-38 (Alaska 1986).
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leading cases adopting a per se exclusion for hypnotically refreshed testimony based
on the testimony's failure to meet the Frye test are State v. Mack"s4 and People v.
Shirley. 1
8 5
The Mack court was the first state supreme court to impose a per se exclusion
for hypnotically refreshed testimony. 6 In Mack, charges were brought against the
defendant, David Mack, for criminal sexual conduct in the first degree in violation
of a Minnesota statute.1 7 Before any determination of probable cause had been
made, the district court certified to the Supreme Court of Minnesota the question
concerning the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in a criminal trial. 18
In Mack, the alleged victim, Erickson, met the defendant at a bar. 89 Mack took
Erickson to a motel where they engaged in sexual intercourse."9° Erickson began
bleeding profusely from her vagina.' 9' Mack called for an ambulance to bring her to
the hospital.' One of the ambulance drivers observed that the alleged victim was
"quite drunk" and that her speech was unclear.'93 The driver also testified that
Erickson had trouble walking, but did manage to insist that Mack was not at fault. 194
At the hospital, Erickson was attended by one intern who recorded that she told him
she had "engaged in sexual activity with fingers being placed in her vagina."'
9 g5
Another intern, who was assisting Erickson, stated that Erickson believed that she
had been in a motorcycle accident.'96 This intern theorized that Erickson could not
have been injured by a human fingernail, but rather she was suffering from a cut
through the vaginal tissue into a muscle layer. 1"7 This intern noted that this kind of
injury could be the result of "tearing after childbirth."'9 8
Two days after the incident, after being informed of the possible causes of her
'injury, Erickson telephoned the police.'99 Erickson told police that she could not
184. 292 N.W.2d 764, 764 (Minn. 1980).
185. 723 P.2d 1354, 1354 (Cal. 1982).
186. See Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 765. For a list of cases from other jurisdictions adopting a per se
exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony, see Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of
Hypnotically Refreshed or Enhanced Testimony, 77 A.L.R.4TH 927, 943 (1990).
187. See Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 765.
188. See id.












remember anything after the alleged motorcycle accident, and that she had blacked
out on other drinking occasions.2"° She then agreed to be hypnotized by a lay
hypnotist to refresh her memory.2"' Under hypnosis, the hypnotist suggested that
Erickson recall the events of May 13 and 14 as they transpired. 2 She stated that
Mack "told me to get on the bed and take my clothes off. 2 °3 Then, she stated that
"[h]e told me to spread my legs ..... He pulled out a switchblade and told me he
was going to kill me ... he kept sticking this knife up me and I remember screaming
and screaming."20 4
The Mack court found that there was no evidence to corroborate any of the
details of Erickson's hypnotically refreshed memory of the events.2"5 For example,
Erickson recalled repeated stabbing of her genitalia, but her medical records indicated
that there was only a single deep cut inside her vagina, with no damage to the exterior
regions.2° 6 She described Mack's motorcycle as a black Yamaha, however, Mack's
motorcycle was a maroon Triumph.2 7 Next, Erickson recalled having dinner with her
father that day at the Embers restaurant, and said she ordered pizza.20 8 It was later
discovered that Embers restaurant does not serve pizza.2 °' Lastly, she recalled that
she and her friend, Hazel Durkin, previously met David Mack.2"0 However, Durkin
said they previously met a man named Dave who she described as 5' 1" in height,
with a tattoo on his left arm."2 Mack was 5' 8" and had no tattoos on either arm.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was asked to address the issue of whether.
Erickson's hypnotically refreshed testimony was reliable, and therefore, admissible.
The Mack court held that the proffered testimony was inadmissible under the Frye
test because it did not meet the ordinary standard of reliability for admission." 2
Erickson's testimony could not be independently corroborated and was replete with
factual inconsistencies and errors.213 The Mack court reasoned that hypnotically
refreshed memories that are accurate cannot be distinguished from confabulated
recollections by either the person hypnotized or the expert hypnotist.' In addition,
the court reasoned that after a hypnosis session, the account of the incident differs
from ordinary recall because the hypnotized person becomes subjectively convinced
of the truth of the hypnotic recollection, which hinders that recall from being
200. See id.













214. See id. at 769-70.
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challenged by cross-examination.1 5 Consequently, the court noted that, based upon
the reliability problems posed by hypnosis testimony, it would be extremely difficult
to formulate an admissibility rule which is sensitive to these problems.216 The Mack
court held that "[riegardless of whether such evidence is offered by the defense or
by the prosecution, a witness whose memory has been 'revived' under hypnosis
ordinarily must not be permitted to testify.., to matters which he or she 'remem-
bered' under hypnosis. '21 7
The second preeminent case utilizing the Frye test to adopt a per se exclusionary
rule for hypnotically refreshed testimony is People v. Shirley.2 I In Shirley, the
complaining witness testified that the defendant forced her to perform sexual
intercourse and oral copulation. 219 At trial, the defendant moved to exclude the
witness's hypnotically refreshed testimony.220 The trial court denied the motion,
ruling that the prior hypnosis of a witness affects the testimony's weight, but not its
admissibility.22' Accordingly, the court directed that the facts and circumstances of
the witness's hypnosis should be put before the jury.222 The jury believed part of her
story, and convicted the defendant of rape.223 However, the jury also found that the
witness was lying when she described in detail the alleged act of oral copulation.224
The defendant was acquitted as to that charge, and appealed the rape conviction to
the California Supreme Court.225
The principal question on appeal was whether the complaining witness should
be allowed to testify after she had undergone hypnosis for the purpose of refreshing
her memory.226 The supreme court identified the dangers associated with hypnoti-
cally refreshed testimony as hyper suggestibility, hyper compliance, inability to
distinguish accurate from inaccurate recall, and enhanced confidence, however, the
court noted that there is no correlation between the confidence of the testimony and
215. See id. The court further noted that after hypnosis, the ordinary indicia of reliability are
"completely erased" because of the strength of the witness's conviction. See id. at 769. For example,
a hypnotic witness is able to pass lie detector tests regarding the truth of statements made under
hypnosis although researchers know these statements to be completely false. See id.
216. See id. at 770.
217. Id. at 771.
218. 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982).
219. See id. at 1355.
220. See id. at 1359.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 1355.
224. See id. The court noted that the record was "replete with instances in which her testimony was
vague, changeable, self-contradictory, or prone to unexplained lapses of memory." See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
its accuracy.227 Using the Frye test, the court held that the witness's testimony
relating to events recalled after hypnosis was per se inadmissible because hypnosis
6 is so widely viewed as unreliable.228 Consequently, the conviction was reversed.229
Contreras v. State230 is another leading case that excluded hypnotically refreshed
testimony, but in this case the decision was based on the argument that this type of
testimony is always more prejudicial than probative.231 In Contreras, the defendant
was accused of kidnaping, assault, and sexual assault.232 Before Contreras's arrest,
the victim was hypnotized in an effort to reveal the suspect's identity.233 The victim
later identified Contreras as her assailant.2" Prior to trial, Contreras filed a motion
to exclude all testimony by the victim on grounds that the victim's memory was
tainted by the hypnotic session."' The trial court held that the victim's testimony
"'pertaining to the subject matter considered during [the] hypnotic session' was to
be excluded[;]" the remaining testimony would be admitted.236 "This ruling barred
the introduction of [the victim's] identification of Contreras at trial." '237 The trial
court ruled that the Frye test for admissibility of scientific evidence was applicable
and that hypnosis did not satisfy the test's requirements.238 On appeal, the court held
that hypnotically adduced testimony was admissible, and reversed the trial court.239
Contreras petitioned the Supreme Court of Alaska for review.2'
The main issue before the court was whether the victim's hypnotically refreshed
testimony, identifying Contreras as the assailant, was admissible.241 The court
concluded that hypnosis renders a witness's subsequent testimony inadmissible per
se.242 The court reasoned that hypnotically refreshed testimony is always more
prejudicial than probative. 3 The court recognized that most courts use a case-by-
227. See id. at 1382-83.
228. See id. at 1383-84. Although the Shirley court adopted a per se exclusionary rule, it did make
one notable exception: individuals will be permitted to testify as to any topic wholly unrelated to the
subject of the hypnotic session. See id. at 1384.
229. See id. at 1387.
230. 718 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1986).
231. See id. at 136. Federal Rule of Evidence provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.






238. See id. On the basis of expert testimony, the court found that Contreras's right to confront the




241. See id. at 129-30.
242. See id. at 133.
243. See id. at 136.
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case approach when balancing the testimony's probative value versus its prejudicial
effect. 2' However, the court found that "the case-by-case approach is time
consuming, creates a risk of non-uniform results and requires judges to become
hypnosis experts ... ,,245 Thus, the court concluded that the prejudice/probative
balance weighs in favor of per se exclusion.246 The court noted that the potential
dangers of heightened suggestibility, confabulation, and enhanced certainty on the
part of witnesses who were previously hypnotized prejudices the opposing party so
much that even expert testimony cannot "sufficiently overcome the likelihood that a
jury may be misled by such testimony." '247
IV. A MULTIPLE'S TESTIMONY IS TESTIMONY WHILE UNDER HYPNOSIS
Regardless of which personality is testifying, a Multiple's testimony will be
testimony while under hypnosis.248 A Multiple will always testify either as a host or
some other alter personality. Every time an alter personality testifies, the testimony
will be given by that alter personality while under hypnosis because all alters are in
self-hypnotic dissociative states. Similarly, in a vast majority of cases when the host
testifies, the testimony concerns the conduct or recollections of a particular alter.249
Such testimony is testimony while under hypnosis because the host will be recalling
events, conversations, and experiences that all took place while the particular alter
was present. In other words, the host will be testifying regarding matters that were
experienced by an alter who was in a self-hypnotic dissociative state at the time the
experiences occurred.25 This would be analogous to a lay witness reading a
244. See id. at 137.
245. See id. at 137-38.
246. See id. at 138.
247. See id.
248. See Bliss, Report of 14 Cases, supra note 76, at 1393-94 (explaining that the domain of the
personalities is hypnosis and that Multiples are excellent hypnotic subjects). For a discussion of the
interplay between MPD and self-hypnosis, see BLISS, supra note 12, at 117-63.
249. An overwhelming majority of lawsuits involving Multiples as parties or witnesses deal with the
Multiple's own criminal conduct or third party abuse of the Multiple. Under either scenario, the
criminal conduct or abuse takes place when an alter was in control. For example, in situations of abuse,
the Multiple is usually abused when a child alter or some other alter is present. See, e.g., Dorsey v.
State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 225-26 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the victim was abused when she was
in a dissociative state and tobk on the voice and personality of a five to nine year old child); Wall v.
Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 400 (Minn. 1998) (recounting that the victims
were sexually abused in dissociative states and that alter personalities first reported the abuse).
250. Whenever the host testifies regarding the experiences of an alter, or when an alter testifies about
the experiences of the host or another alter, such testimony is arguably hearsay. See, e.g., Dorsey, 426
S.E.2d at 227 (recognizing that a hearsay objection to a Multiple's testimony may be sustained if
counsel were not given the opportunity to cross-examine the specific alter); People v. Smith, 459
N.Y.S.2d 528, 540 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1983) (noting that if either party sought to introduce the contents
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transcript of his own statements made while he was under hypnosis during a hypnotic
session."' Courts universally hold that such testimony while under hypnosis is
inadmissible per se.252
To compound matters further, a Multiple's testimony is often hypnosis
embedded within hypnosis. Hypnosis is an integral component of a Multiple's
therapy.253 During therapy, a Multiple is placed under hypnosis to recall the
existence and experience of alter personalities in an attempt to integrate these
personalities.254 When the Multiple later testifies regarding an alter's experiences,
he will often be testifying as to memories that were first recalled during the hypnotic
therapy session.255 Under these circumstances, the Multiple would be testifying as
to memories first recalled during hypnotic therapy, regarding what happened to an
alter while the alter was in a self-hypnotic state. Thus, a Multiple would be using
hypnosis to remember what happened to him while under hypnosis. Therefore, a
Multiple's testimony is always testimony given while under hypnosis, and is often
hypnosis embedded within hypnosis.
V. COURTS' REFUSAL TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT MPD TESTIMONY IS
HYPNOSIS TESTIMONY AND TO UTILIZE HYPNOSIS PRECEDENT
Currently, courts do not recognize the inherent connection between hypnosis
testimony and a Multiple's testimony. Courts that have addressed the question of
whether a Multiple's testimony is admissible include the supreme courts of
Montana256 and Minnesota,257 and the appellate courts of Georgia25 and Indiana.259
of the actual hypnotic interviews for the purpose of proving their truth, such hearsay offers would be
prohibited by the rules of evidence).
251. See, e.g., People v. Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d 539,543-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that
evidence of a subject's responses while under hypnosis is inadmissible to establish the truth of the
statements made or to bolster the credibility of the defendant's story). The court also noted that "other
jurisdictions have universally disallowed such evidence... ,reasoning that it is unreliable." Id. at 544.;
see also Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that
use of a videotape of a hypnotic session is highly prejudicial, and therefore, inadmissible).
252. See cases cited supra note 168.
253. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 193-220; Kluft, supra note 76, at 230-33.
254. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 198-200, 223-35 (explaining the therapeutic role hypnosis plays
when clinicians are working with Multiples).
255. See id.
256. See State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 94-95 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (1991).
257. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395,408-11 (Minn. 1998).
258. See Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227-28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
259. See Thornton v. State, 653 N.E.2d 493, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). In Thornton, the appellant
was convicted for molesting his daughter who suffered from MPD. See id. at 495. The trial court
permitted the daughter's alter personalities to testify. See id. at 497. Thornton failed to request a
competency hearing at trial, nor did he raise the issue on appeal. See id. at 496 n.l. Although the
appellate court ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the daughter to testify,
the sole basis of its ruling was that Thornton failed to carry his burden of proof on the competency issue
because he did not present evidence to the trial court. See id. at 497. Because the appellate court based
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The MPD cases from these courts are discussed below. Each of these courts failed
to make the connection between hypnosis and MPD. Although there is a wealth of
hypnosis precedent to provide guidance to courts confronted with a Multiple's
testimony,260 courts continue to view this body of precedent as inapplicable. Unless
courts accept the inherent connection between hypnosis and MPD, they will continue
to perpetuate the myth that MPD testimony is reliable.
A. State v. Donnelly
In State v. Donnelly,26' the Supreme Court of Montana addressed whether the
testimony of a Multiple was reliable.262 The defendant was convicted when a jury
found him guilty of incest.263 The defendant's adopted daughter, Janey Doe, was the
alleged victim. 21 Janey Doe suffered from MPD. 265 She, and several of her alter
personalities, were permitted to testify before the jury at trial.266 During trial, the
State provided expert testimony that "Janey Doe's multiple personalities and bizarre
self-destructive activities were classic symptoms of 'abused child syndrome' and that
Janey fit the 'abused child' profile. The defense strategy was to present alternate
explanations for the observed personality features of [Janey Doe]."267
One of the issues raised on appeal was whether the district court erred when it
permitted Janey Doe and her alter personalities to testify at trial. 268 The district court
ruled that the victim was competent to testify, and that the victim's credibility was a
proper question for the jury.269 Further, "the District Court determined that Janey
Doe had the capacity to express herself, to remember what occurred, and to
understand her duty to tell the truth., 270 The district court assessed Janey Doe's
competency based on its observation of her as a witness. 271' The court stated: "It is
true that [Janey Doe] suffers from extensive and severe emotional damage because
its holding on the appellant's failure to carry his burden of proof rather than on the reliability of a
Multiple's testimony, this case is not discussed in detail.
260. See supra notes 139-247 and accompanying text.
261. 798 P.2d 89 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (1991).
262. See id. at 94-95.
263. See id. at 90.
264. See id. at 90-91.
265. See id. at 91.
266. See id. at 91, 95.
267. See id. at 92.
268. See id. at 90.
269. See id. at 95.
270. Id.
271. See id.
of the incestuous actions of the defendant .... However, she is able to discern the
truth from falsity and her credibility is properly a question for the jury. '272 The
district court found that there was nothing in the witness's demeanor that would
demonstrate an inability to testify. 273 The court also determined that each of the alters
testifying consistently incriminated the defendant.274
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, stating that competency depends on the
witness's "capacity to remember the occurrence and the ability of the witness to
relate her impressions of what occurred. '27 5 The court further stated that "[a]ny
inconsistencies within her testimony or possible fabrication would affect Janey Doe's
credibility not her competency. '276 Finally, the court held that the "District Court.
. did not abuse its discretion in deciding that Janey Doe understood her duty to tell
the truth and had the ability to clearly communicate her accounts of the events in
question." '277
B. Dorsey v. State
A Georgia appellate court addressed whether a Multiple's testimony is reliable
in Dorsey v. State.27 ' At trial, Marilyn and James Dorsey were convicted of rape,
aggravated sodomy, and sexual battery. 9 The alleged victim, a high school junior,
developed MPD as the result of sexual abuse during her childhood. 8° The victim had
at least two personalities, "Big Wendy" and "Little Wendy. ' ' 28' When confronted
with upsetting situations, the victim's host personality, Big Wendy, retreated and
Little Wendy took over.28 2 When Little Wendy appeared, the victim took on the voice
and personality of a five to nine year old child.283 Expert testimony at trial suggested
that Big Wendy had no recollection of Little Wendy's activities.2 " After the trial of
Marilyn Dorsey, doctors discovered additional personalities, such as "Trouble. 285
"Trouble" appeared when any of the personalities were being physically hurt. 26 At
trial, the victim was permitted to testify against the Dorseys in a dissociative state.28 7
272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 94 (citing State v. Newman, 790 P.2d 971, 974 (Mont. 1990)).
276. Id. at 94-95 (emphasis in original).
277. Id. at 95.
278. See 426 S.E.2d 224, 226-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
279. See id. at 225.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 225-26.
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The defendants appealed their convictions, challenging the admissibility of the
victim's testimony on the basis that it was inadmissible hypnosis testimony.288 The
appellants argued that a dissociative state was similar to a hypnotic state, and thus,
dissociative testimony should be treated the same as hypnosis testimony.289 They
further argued that the Supreme Court of Georgia held that statements made by a
person while in a hypnotic state were inadmissible.29 The court of appeals rejected
this argument, explaining that there was an important difference between hypnosis
testimony and testimony while in a dissociative state.291 The court stated that "[t]he
most important difference for our purposes is that hypnosis is a process a person
voluntarily chooses to engage in... while a dissociative state is involuntary and,
although triggered by external stimuli, comes solely from within. '292 In recognizing
this difference, the court explained that the involuntariness of a dissociative state
makes statements inherently more reliable than statements made during hypnosis.293
The court found that a Multiple's testimony while in a dissociative state could be
tested for reliability because the jury has the opportunity to observe the witness and
to evaluate her demeanor.294 In addition, the court stated that the appellants had the
opportunity to test the reliability of the victim's testimony through cross-
examination.295 Thus, the court held that the line of authority holding that statements
made by a person in a hypnotic state are inadmissible did not control the admissibility
of a Multiple's testimony while in a dissociative state.296
After determining that hypnosis cases did not control the admissibility of a
Multiple's testimony, the court of appeals considered whether such testimony was
nevertheless admissible.297 The court recognized that the purpose of a trial is to
determine truth, and that admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial
21court. 98 With these principles in mind, the court ruled that the victim's testimony
while in a dissociative state was admissible for several reasons. First, the court was
convinced by undisputed expert testimony that a person in a dissociative state would
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. See id. (citing Bobo v. State, 327 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. 1985) for the proposition that "statements
made by a person while in a hypnotic trance are inadmissible, as the 'reliability of hypnosis has not
been established"').








not lie.2 Second, the court acknowledged that the testimony's reliability was
supported by a number of prior consistent statements." Third, the court relied on
the fact that the jury observed the Multiple during her testimony and that appellants
had the opportunity to cross-examine her.3"' Fourth, the court ruled that if testimony
from an individual in a dissociative state was never admissible, then persons aware
of an individual's dissociative disorder could easily take advantage of the situation."°
The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
Multiple's testimony. °3
C. Wall v. Fairview Hospital & Healthcare Services
The most recent case to deal with the admissibility of a Multiple's testimony is
Wall v. Fairview Hospital & Healthcare Services."° In Wall, appellants Sandra
Slavik and Ruth Wall brought suit against the estate of their deceased psychiatrist Dr.
Routt, nurse Kathy House, and Fairview Hospitals.3 5 The plaintiffs sought punitive
damages for alleged sexual abuse and mistreatment that occurred while they were
patients."° Both plaintiffs had extensive histories of physical, emotional, and sexual
abuse.30 7 Plaintiffs struggled with depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, suicidal
tendencies, and episodes of self-mutilation.30 8 Slavik and Wall were both diagnosed
with MPD.3 °9
Each plaintiff had numerous alters.3" ° Slavik called herself Mary and her alters
included Elizabeth, Kate, Amelia, Grandma, and Anne.3 ' Wall's alters included
Tootie Kay, Michael, Kay, the Little Girls, the Destroyer, the Silent One, and
Daniel.312 Before trial, House moved to exclude all testimony from Slavik and Wall
regarding matters that first came to light while they were in dissociative states.
House relied on the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mack,314 which






304. 584 N.W.2d 395, 408-11 (Minn. 1998).
305. See id. at 398.
306. See id. at 402.
307. See id. at 399.
308. See id.
309. See id. at 398.




314. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
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inadmissible.315 House argued that Mack's prohibition of hypnosis testimony applied
equally to testimony regarding what transpired while a Multiple was in a dissociative
state." 6 The trial court stated that it was unknown whether dissociation was a form
of hypnosis." 7 House also sought to prevent Slavik and Wall from testifying while
they were in dissociative states.3"8 The court found that Slavik and Wall were
competent to testify even while in dissociative states.319
At trial, Slavik and Wall testified that during therapy, their psychiatrist, Dr.
Routt, would hypnotize them or call forth their alter personalities, and sexually abuse
them while they were in their dissociative states.320 The court allowed the jury to
observe testimony from several of their alter personalities.321 Defense counsel had
the opportunity to cross-examine each alter about their ability to tell the truth.322 The
jury awarded Slavik and Wall approximately $5 million.323 House appealed.324 The
court of appeals affirmed, concluding "that hypnosis and dissociation are fundamen-
tally different" and that "Mack did not bar any testimony that first came to light
during a dissociative episode. 32 5 House then appealed to the Minnesota Supreme
Court.326
The court in Wall addressed two issues pertinent to this Article. The first issue
was whether the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Slavik and Wall
were competent to testify while in dissociative states.32 7 The second issue was wheth-
er dissociation was a form of self-hypnosis or sufficiently similar to hypnosis, so that
any testimony first related while in a dissociative state would be barred.328
On the first issue, the court noted that the determination of witness competency
was within the trial court's discretion.329 The court recognized that if the witness
understood the obligation to tell the truth and could recall and relate the relevant
events, the witness was competent and should be permitted to testify.330 The court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ruled that Slavik and





320. See id. at 400.
321. See id. at 401.
322. See id. at 409.
323. See id. at 402.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 409.
326. See id. at 399, 408.
327. See id. at 408.
328. See id. at 409.
329. See id.
330. See id.
Wall were competent and permitted them to testify while in dissociative states.33'
The court stated:
[P]resumably, if one of the alters said something indicating that she or he might not
be competent to testify, the defense would have made a specific objection and the court
would have made a ruling on the objection. Yet the record is void of objections based
on the competency of specific, alters, even though some of the alters who testified were
only three or four years old. We conclude that the [trial] court did not abuse its
discretion and, under the facts of this case, its decision to allow Slavik's and Wall's
alters to testify was entirely appropriate.332
The second issue before the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically required the
court to make the connection between hypnosis and MPD. The court was asked to
decide whether dissociation was a form of self-hypnosis or sufficiently similar to
hypnosis so that the court's earlier decision in State v. Mack would bar Slavik's and
Wall's testimony.333 In addressing this issue, the court recognized that it would be
required to answer two questions: "[F]irst, whether some form of hypnosis actually
occurred when the women dissociated[;]" and second, whether the alter's memories
were first recalled while under some form of hypnosis.334
As to the first question, the court refused to equate dissociation with hypnosis;
it rejected the lower courts' uncritical reliance on Dorsey v. State and its "holding
that dissociation [was] fundamentally different from hypnosis when considering the
reliability of witness testimony.""33 The court noted that "the Dorsey court never
explained why the nonvolitional nature of dissociation [made) the resulting
statements more reliable than statements articulated during hypnosis." '336 In addition,
the court noted that the Dorsey court's reasoning might have been grounded in the
mistaken belief that a "victim in a dissociative state would not lie." '337
The court recognized that several of Slavik's and Wall's witnesses testified that
MPD can result in incomplete memories.338 Moreover, no witness testified that
dissociation was fundamentally dissimilar from hypnosis.339 Although the court
noted that many of the concerns expressed about hypnosis testimony in its Mack
opinion also applied to testimony produced during dissociation, the court ruled that





335. See id. at 410. For a discussion of Dorsey, see supra notes 278-303 and accompanying text.
336. Id.
337. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
338. See id.
339. See id. One of Slavik's psychotherapists testified that many people with MPD, including
Slavik, engage in self-hypnosis and can induce a trance. See id. This witness also described Slavik's
presentation of alters at her therapist's request as involving hypnosis or trance. See id.
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equivalent to hypnosis.3 ° First, the court noted that if a Multiple's testimony was
excluded per se as inadmissible hypnosis testimony, then someone who was aware
of the Multiple's disorder could take advantage of the Multiple with impunity. 4"
Therefore, the Multiple's disorder, which led to the Multiple's abuse, would become
a shield of protection for the abuser. 2 Second, the court refused to adopt a per se
rule treating a Multiple's testimony as equivalent to hypnosis testimony because the
psychiatric community's understanding of dissociative disorders, such as MPD, was
in a state of flux. 3 The court stated that "the mental health community [had] not yet
reached a consensus on the nature of the disorder."'3 " Based on these two policy
arguments, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
allowed the jury to determine whether dissociation experienced by a Multiple was
similar to hypnosis, and whether a Multiple's memories of abuse were actually
recalled during dissociation. 5 Therefore, the court clearly placed the responsibility
of making the hypnosis and MPD connection in the hands of the jury, and urged
courts to proceed "thoughtfully and cautiously" when witnesses with MPD appear
in their courtrooms.'
VI. CRITIQUE OF MPD CASES
The approaches of the courts in Donnelly, Dorsey, and Wall are flawed for
several reasons. First, each of the courts erred by permitting Multiples to testify in
dissociative states. Every time an alter testifies, the testimony is given by the alter
while under hypnosis. 7 Courts universally hold that testimony while under
hypnosis, and evidence of what a subject said while under hypnosis is inadmissible
per se.34 Thus, when the courts in Donnelly, Dorsey, and Wall ruled that alter
personalities could testify, they were condoning the admission of inherently




344. Id. at 410.
345. Seeid. at411.
346. See id.
347. See supra notes 248-255 and accompanying text.
348. See, e.g., People v. Busch, 366 P.2d 314, 319-20 (Cal. 1961); Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330,
340 (Fla. 1984); Pearson v. State, 441 N.E.2d 468,472 (Ind. 1982); State v. Haislip, 701 P.2d 909,924
(Kan. 1985); State v. Conley, 627 P.2d 1174, 1177-78 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Collins, 464 A.2d
1028, 1034 (Md. 1983); People v. Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); State
v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508,521-22 (N.D. 1950); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1327 (Okla. Crim. App.




These cases are a perfect illustration of the age old maxim that "hard cases make
bad law."35 The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Wall expressly conceded
that Multiples are highly suggestible and have an increased belief in the validity of
inaccurate memories. 351 Moreover, the court noted that cross-examination is an
unavailing means to ferret out the truth regarding a Multiple's memories. 352 It is
ironic that, after conceding that these inherent dangers are present in a Multiple's
testimony, the court nevertheless felt compelled to admit the testimony. The same
court refused to admit hypnotically refreshed testimony which was subject to these
identical inherent dangers; yet the court was perfectly willing in Wall to admit
testimony of even more dubious quality. What the court failed to recognize is that,
unlike hypnotically refreshed testimony, a Multiple's testimony is actually testimony
while under hypnosis.53 By admitting a Multiple's testimony, these courts have
ignored the long line of cases holding that testimony while under hypnosis is
inadmissible per se.354
Second, each of these courts were mistaken when they concluded that a lay jury
is capable of assessing the reliability of a Multiple's testimony. In essence, these
courts were asking a jury to determine whether a Multiple's disorder made his
testimony unreliable.355 However, ajuror should be the last person to decide whether
a Multiple's testimony is affected by the Multiple's unrecognized abuse of self-
hypnosis. The dangers of hypnosis, such as confabulation, 351 suggestion, 5M and
memory hardening,358 make the most highly skilled psychotherapist unable to
differentiate between a true recollection, a fantasy, or a statement that was the
product of suggestion.359 Dr. Diamond, a noted expert on hypnosis, acknowledges
that "[n]o one, regardless of experience, can verify the accuracy of the hypnotically
349. See infra notes 399-595 and accompanying text.
350. See People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848, 859 (1I. App. Ct. 1979) (Craven, J., dissenting).
351. See Wall, 584 N.W.2d at 409.
352. See id.
353. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
355. The court in Wall took this question a step further. The Wall court stated that it was a disputed
factual issue whether dissociation was a form of hypnosis. See 584 N.W.2d at 401. Therefore, not only
was the jury asked to assess the reliability of each Multiple's testimony, but they were required to
become scientific experts knowledgeable about hypnosis and MPD. Lay jurors are not equipped for
such a scientific inquiry. In addition, if this question is treated as a factual one, it will cause
inconsistency. It is highly probable that a jury in one case will decide that dissociation is not a form
of hypnosis, while in another case a jury will decide that dissociation is a form of hypnosis. Thus,
Minnesota will be admitting dissociative testimony from Multiples in some cases while excluding this
testimony in other cases.
356. See infra notes 466-73 and accompanying text.
357. See infra notes 449-65 and accompanying text.
358. See infra notes 474-83 and accompanying text.
359. See Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective
Witness, 68 CAL. L. REV. 313, 337 (1980).
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enhanced memory. ' ' 3 ° Thus, if experts cannot verify the accuracy of a Multiple's
testimony, neither can the trier of fact. Because the courts are unable to verify the
reliability of a Multiple's testimony, they cannot expect that a jury will be able to do
SO.
36 1
Additionally, if one is to accept these courts' rulings that the reliability of a
Multiple's testimony is for the jury to determine, then such rulings have far reaching
consequences. For example, under this reasoning, voice print, truth serum,
polygraph, or any other method of judging truth would be rendered admissible if the
trier of fact decided to give the evidence such weight.362 There is no reason to make
a special exception to admit the hypnosis testimony of a Multiple while refusing to
admit these other types of evidence.
Third, courts admit a Multiple's testimony based on the erroneous belief that a
Multiple can accurately recall the events that transpired. 363 "Hypnotic experiences,
whether induced by a therapist or spontaneously experienced, can be as real as events
in the real world-in fact, they are often indistinguishable from reality."31 Psychother-
apists generally acknowledge that there is neither an expert nor a trier of fact who can
differentiate between a true recollection, a fantasy, or a statement that is the product
of suggestion.365 Thus, a court's belief that a Multiple can accurately recall events
that transpired is mistaken. Neither a court nor ajury can accurately assess which of
a Multiple's recollections are accurate and which are the product of fantasy.3M
360. See id. Dr. Diamond notes that "[i]n ordinary life experience we tend to judge the validity and
accuracy of memories by the amount of detail recalled[.]" See id. at 337-38. Hypnosis subjects can
recite events in great detail. See id. An age progression experiment demonstrates the concept of
confabulation. See id. at 337. A subject can be hypnotized, instructed to progress in age ten years into
the future, and then asked to describe his surroundings. See id. at 337-38. He will relate what he
imagines he sees in great detail. See id. at 338. However, his memory is false, illustrating the
remarkable ability of the human mind to confabulate. See id.
361. It is interesting to note that the Wall court states that it is for the jury to determine whether a
Multiple's testimony is unreliable hypnosis testimony, yet neither the trial, appellate, nor supreme court
in Wall defined "hypnosis" for the jury. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 568 N.W.2d
194, 207 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). The court of appeals stated that the exact parameters and
definition of hypnosis are unsettled. See id. The court also noted that "the trial court was wise not to
attempt to define a term that is the subject of such debate." Id. If the courts were unable to define
hypnosis, how could they expect a lay juror to determine whether a Multiple's testimony was unreliable
hypnosis testimony? The Wall court gave the jury an inappropriate task, a task the court itself was
unable to accomplish.
362. See People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848, 860 (fI1. App. Ct. 1979) (Craven, J., dissenting).
363. See, e.g., State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 95 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State
v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (1991).
364. BLISS, supra note 12, at 79.
365. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 314; see also BLISS, supra note 12, at 160-62 (addressing legal
problems associated with a Multiple's testimony).
366. See infra notes 447-535 and accompanying text.
Fourth, courts admit a Multiple's testimony based on the mistaken belief that a
Multiple can fully understand and appreciate his duty to tell the truth. 67 Most
Multiples have alter personalities of children or infants.368 It is highly likely that the
testimony of one of these child alters would be the central focus of the litigation or
prosecution because these alters contain most memories of trauma and abuse.369 The
child or infant alter is often too young to understand the nature of the oath and the
obligation to testify truthfully.370 Further, a serious problem arises if the court
administers the oath only to the host personality, and not to other personalities who
emerge at trial. The other personalities would likely have no recollection of the
oath.37 1 Therefore, courts are mistaken in their belief that a Multiple can fully
understand his duty to tell the truth;
Fifth, a Multiple's testimony has been admitted based on the erroneous belief
that a Multiple in a dissociative state would not lie.3 72 All personalities, when they
appear, "are partially or completely divorced from judgment, moral mandates, and
other factors in memory that ordinarily would function. 373 Some personalities are
deceptive by nature and lie all of the time. For example, alters such as "Satan" or the
"Tempter" will intentionally lie or mislead.374 In addition, some alters may not
intentionally lie or mislead, but will do so unknowingly. Multiples are typically
victims of enhanced states of suggestion and fantasy. As a result, they often testify
to falsehoods while believing in the accuracy of their statements.375 Further, no one,
including experts, can verify the accuracy of a Multiple's hypnotic testimony. Thus,
courts are wrong to conclude that a Multiple does not lie while in a dissociative state.
Sixth, courts admit a Multiple's testimony based on the unsound reasoning that
the opportunity to cross-examine a Multiple is an adequate safeguard to assure
reliability. 376 The cross-examination of a Multiple will not assure the accuracy and
truthfulness of his testimony for six reasons. First, a Multiple is susceptible to
heightened suggestibility.377 Second, Multiples confabulate.378 Third, Multiples
experience memory hardening.3 79 Fourth, Multiples have compartmentalized
367. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395,409 (Minn. 1998); Donnelly,
798 P.2d at 95.
368. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 107-08.
369. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 125-26.
370. See infra notes 432-36 and accompanying text.
371. See infra notes 437-46 and accompanying text.
372. See Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting undisputed expert
testimony indicating that a victim in a dissociative state would not lie). But see Wall, 584 N.W.2d at
410 (criticizing the Dorsey court's reasoning that a victim in a dissociative state would not lie).
373. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 148.
374. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 78-79, 113.
375. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 337-38 (observing that subjects under hypnosis often recall
events with amazing detail and are convinced in the accuracy of their memories).
376. See Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 227-28.
377. See infra notes 449-65 and accompanying text.
378. See infra notes 466-73 and accompanying text.
379. See infra notes 474-83 and accompanying text.
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minds. s° Fifth, Multiples may engage in switching when testifying.38' Sixth, access
to Multiples' medical records often proves difficult because the records are usually
protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 82 For each of these reasons,
cross-examination is an inadequate safeguard to assure the reliability of a Multiple's
testimony.
Seventh, courts admit a Multiple's testimony based on the argument that
excluding the testimony will permit others to take advantage of Multiples with
impunity. 83 Courts asserting this argument recognize that the testimony should be
admitted because the Multiple's testimony is usually the only evidence of his abuse,
and thus, it is crucial.384 This argument fails because the crucial question is not
380. See infra notes 484-502 and accompanying text.
381. See infra notes 503-27 and accompanying text.
382. For example, the court in Donnelly refused to give the defendant access to the Multiple's
psychological records. See State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 92 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (1991). The extraordinary characteristics of a Multiple, such
as heightened suggestibility, confabulation, memory hardening, switching, and compartmentalization,
make it virtually impossible for counsel to cross-examine without access to these records. The records
help determine the extent to which the therapy process itself may have created the Multiple's memories
and beliefs of traumatic experiences. See Elizabeth Loftus, Patient-Psychotherapist Privilege: Access
to Clinical Records in the Tangled Web of Repressed Memory Litigation, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 109,
121-22 (1996). The Donnelly court's statement that the defendant did not need these records because
he was aware of the Multiple's mental and psychological history misses the point. These records are
not needed to confirm her diagnosis, but rather are essential to uncover whether her memories and
beliefs were created through suggestion. Finally, because Multiples have complex compartmentalized
minds, the cross-examiner needs access to these records to understand the composition of the Multiple's
personality system. Such knowledge is essential to gain access to a particular alter and to attack the
reliability of his testimony. For example, because the Donnelly court refused to allow access to the
Multiple's psychological records, the defendant was unable to call forth two of her alters who he alleged
would have given inconsistent testimony. See 798 P.2d at 94. Therefore, his attorney's cross-
examination was ineffective.
383. See Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); Wall v. Falrview Hosp. &
Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 410 (Minn. 1998). After criticizing the Minnesota Court of
Appeals' "uncritical reliance" on Dorsey, the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Wall adopted the
"impunity" argument from Dorsey without evaluating it. See Wall, 584 N.W.2d at 410.
384. See, e.g., Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 227 (noting that ifa Multiple's testimony is never admissible,
then others will be able to victimize Multiples with impunity); Wall, 584 N.W.2d at 410 (same). When
a Multiple patient is abused by his therapist, the therapist and the Multiple are usually the only two
individuals present. Because the therapist cannot be compelled to testify against himself, courts
recognize that if the Multiple's testimony were excluded, the exclusion of this testimony would become
a shield of protection for the offending therapist. This need not be the case. If there is a genuine
concern that the exclusion of a Multiple's testimony would allow health care professionals to take
advantage of the Multiple, then other precautionary steps can be taken, such as having a chaperone
present when a Multiple is treated. To protect the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the chaperone
should be an employee of the health care facility. Moreover, third parties can be present during
psychological examinations without destroying the privilege if they are present to protect the patient's
interest. See 3 JACK B. WEINsTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
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whether the testimony is the only evidence, but instead, whether the testimony is
reliable. Even if the Multiple's testimony is the only evidence, if it is unreliable, it
should be excluded. Federal Rule of Evidence 102 acknowledges that the rules must
be "construed to secure fairness... to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined." '385 By focusing on the fact that a Multiple's
testimony is the only evidence, courts abdicate their responsibility to secure fairness
and pursue the truth.386 Instead, courts should follow the approach taken in
Greenfield v. Robinson387 where the court excluded hypnosis testimony, although it
was the only evidence of a crime, because the testimony was unreliable.388
In Greenfield, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder.389 The
defendant argued that the trial court erroneously excluded expert testimony regarding
statements he made while in a hypnotic trance.3 90 Rejecting his argument, the court
ruled that the testimony was inadmissible because there was no showing that such
evidence is reliable.3 91 The court declared that testimony which may be of dubious
quality should not be admitted merely because a crime has no eyewitnesses or direct
evidence.3 92 Courts should follow Greenfield, and exclude a Multiple's testimony as
unreliable regardless of whether it is the only evidence of a crime.
Eighth, admitting a Multiple's testimony because the psychiatric community's
understanding of MPD is in a state of flux is nonsensical.3 93 If psychiatric and
psychotherapeutic experts cannot agree on the nature of the disorder and its effects
on memory and recall, the Multiple's testimony must be excluded per se. Exclusion
is mandated by the Frye test for the admissibility of scientific evidence.3" When
determining whether to apply Frye to hypnosis testimony, courts recognize that the
basic question is not so much whether the hypnosis process is scientific, but "whether
504.08[2], at 504-26 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). The therapist should explain to the
patient that the chaperone is there for their mutual protection. Once this is established and the patient
becomes accustomed to the chaperone's presence during therapy, therapy should proceed as normal.
385. See FED. R. EvtD. 102.
386. If the Multiple's testimony is the only evidence of a crime, then it is arguably even more
imperative that the testimony be excluded. Justice is certainly not served by convicting and imprisoning
a defendant based on testimony of such dubious quality when there is a complete lack of corroborating
evidence.
387. 413 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Va. 1976).
388. See id. at 1120-21.
389. Seeid. at 1115.
390. See id. at 1120. The expert revealed that while under hypnosis, the defendant recounted the
circumstances of the murder in much greater detail. See id. at 1117. In addition, the defendant recalled
chasing after a man who was present at the crime scene. See id.
391. See id. at 1120. The court excluded the testimony although it was noted "there were no
eyewitnesses and only minute evidence to suggest that the defendant did not commit the crime." See
id.
392. See id. The court stated that it "knows of no rule that requires a judge to accept evidence of
uncertain value to go to a defense that is otherwise completely uncorroborated." Id.
393. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 410-11 (Minn. 1998).
394. See infra notes 414-22 and accompanying text.
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a jury can realistically evaluate the effects of hypnosis. '395 Unless there is general
scientific acceptance regarding the effects of hypnosis on the accuracy of memories,
the "dangers and possibilities of prejudice" in the use of hypnosis testimony should
bar its admissibility under Frye.3" Courts acknowledge that there is no general
scientific acceptance regarding how hypnosis affects the accuracy of memories.397
Therefore, it is ironic that if courts believe that the psychiatric community's
understanding of MPD is in a state of flux, those same courts would refuse to apply
this test to exclude a Multiple's testimony.3 98 If a Multiple's testimony fails to meet
the Frye test for admissibility, it must be excluded per se.
395. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1284-85 & nn.3-4 (Ariz. 1982) (en
banc); Commonwealth v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Mass. 1983); State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651,
654 (Wash. 1984).
396. See Collins, 644 P.2d at 1284-85 & nn.3-4; Kater, 447 N.E.2d at 1195; Martin, 684 P.2d at
654.
397. See, e.g., Collins, 644 P.2d at 1272 (noting there is little agreement amongst authorities on the
scientific reliability of hypnosis testimony); People v. Gonzales, 329 N.W.2d 743, 748 (Mich. 1982)
(acknowledging that "[h]ypnosis has not received sufficient general acceptance in the scientific
community to give reasonable assurance that the results produced under even the best of circumstances
will be sufficiently reliable"); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Neb. 1981) (holding that "until
hypnosis gains acceptance.., a witness previously questioned under hypnosis may not testify"); People
v. Hughes, 453 N.E.2d 484, 491 (N.Y. 1983) (stating that "there is no currently accepted method for
scientifically determining the reliability of hypnotically induced recollection"); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d
1203, 1209 (Utah 1989) (discussing the lack of scientific acceptance for hypnosis as a method of
refreshing recollection); see also People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1366 (Cal. 1982) (holding that
hypnotically induced testimony is so widely viewed as unreliable that it is inadmissible under the Frye
test); People v. Quintanar, 659 P.2d 710,712 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (ruling that "hypnotically induced
recollection has not attained the level of reliability among authorities in the field as required by Frye"),
overruled by People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1987); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768
(Minn. 1980) (explaining that memories retrieved through hypnosis are not scientifically reliable as
accurate under Frye).
398. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Mack adopted a per se exclusion for hypnosis
testimony, arguing that there is no general scientific agreement regarding the accuracy of hypnosis
memories due to the fact that no expert can determine whether a hypnotic memory is "truth, falsehood,
or confabulation." See Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768. This same court in Wall admitted a Multiple's
testimony, conceding that many of the same concerns it expressed in Mack regarding testimony elicited
during hypnosis also apply to the statements of a Multiple produced during dissociation. See Wall, 584
N.W.2d at 410. In addition, the Wall court conceded that there is no general scientific consensus
regarding the effects of MPD on the accuracy of memories "[blecause our understanding of [MPD] is
in flux." See id. at 411. These inconsistent results indicate that the Wall court's decision to admit the
Multiple's testimony is flawed. The court in Wall admitted a Multiple's testimony using the'very same
reasons it used to justify the exclusion of hypnosis testimony in Mack. See id. at 409-10.
VII. COURTS SHOULD EXCLUDE A MULTIPLE'S TESTIMONY PER SE
Courts should adopt a per se exclusionary rule for a Multiple's testimony. The
initial question confronting a court in a case with a Multiple is whether the witness's
testimony meets the minimum threshold of credibility.39 9 In the past, courts have
treated this issue as a question of witness competency.4 °° However, in both the
federal and state court systems, the modem trend is to presume competency,
permitting most witnesses to testify, subject to having their credibility challenged on
cross-examination. 4" The rationale behind the presumption of competency is that the
oath, cross-examination, and the jury's ability to observe the witness are safeguards
to ensure the reliability of testimony. 2 Notwithstanding the presumption of witness
competency, judges have the obligation to determine that the minimum standards of
competency are met,40 3 and these judges are afforded considerable discretion when
making the competency determination.' Courts will sometimes order a preliminary
399. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[1][a], at 601-10.
400. "Competency ... refers to the general qualities that a witness must possess, the minimum
standard of credibility necessary to permit any reasonable person to put any credence in a witness's
testimony." Id. § 601.02[1], at 601-7.
401. See id. § 601.02, at 601-6; see also United States v. Bedonie, 913 F.2d 782,799-800 (10th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that the evolution of law converts the competency question to one of credibility for
the jury); United States v. Jones, 482 F.2d 747, 751-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (acknowledging the modem
trend to relegate questions of competency to a minor role).
402. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EvIDENCE MANUAL §
14.01 [ 1], at 14-2 (1998) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN's MANUAL]; Topham, supra note 156, at 451 & n.220.
403. See WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[1][a], at 601-9; see also Moss v. Ole S.
Real Estate, Inc., 933 F.2d 1300, 1311 (5th Cir. 1991) (remarking that competency is still the focus for
determining whether to admit a witness's testimony); Bedonie, 913 F.2d at 799 (ruling that "even if
credibility considerations can properly be fit under a competency rubric, the District Court has broad
discretion in determining the competency of a witness to testify"); United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d
280, 292 (1 st Cir. 1990) (acknowledging that the trial court is to determine competency); United States
v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 112 (4th Cir. 1984) (emphasizing that the court retains the power to declare
a witness incompetent if the witness lacks personal knowledge, lacks the capacity to recall, or lacks
understanding of the duty to testify truthfully); United States v. Saenz, 747 F.2d 930, 936 (5th Cir.
1984) (observing that the trial court has discretion to determine witness competency); United States v.
Banks, 520 F.2d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1975) (opining that competency to testify, unlike credibility, "is a
limited threshold decision by the trial judge as to whether a proffered witness is capable of testifying
in any meaningful fashion whatsoever"); United States v. Snead, 447 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (noting that a competency hearing was appropriate to determine the witness's ability to testify
due to drug and alcohol abuse), aff'd, 577 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1978).
404. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[l][a], at 601-10; United States v.
Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1978).
Although competency hearings are not required, many courts continue to hold competency hearings and
order psychiatric examinations as they did prior to the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 601. See,
e.g., United States v. Gates, 10 F.3d 765, 766 (11 th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the court may have a
duty to hold a competency hearing when warranted); Odom, 736 F.2d at 111 (noting the great discretion
ajudge has in the procedure he may choose to follow in determining a witness's competency to testify);
United States v. Raineri, 91 F.R.D. 159, 162-63 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (ruling it was proper for the court
to conduct a preliminary competency hearing or a voir dire examination of a witness at the time of trial
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hearing or voir dire examination to determine the competency of a witness.' The
judge's determination of competency will not be reversed unless it was an abuse of
discretion.'
The general presumption of competence.., does not rob the trial judge of the power
to keep a witness from testifying. It merely means that [a] judge must focus on the
proffered testimony rather than the proposed witness. Testimony that has no tendency
to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable than it would be
without that testimony must be excluded.4°7
When dealing with hypnosis testimony, most courts employ the Frye test as a
threshold for determining the admissibility of such evidence. In addition, many
courts utilize a balancing test to determine the admissibility of hypnosis testimony,
weighing the testimony's probative value against the dangers of unfair prejudice,
confusion, or delay."8 "A judge may exclude even relevant testimony if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by such dangers.... ." Although this balancing
approach traditionally requires courts to determine the admissibility of the testimony
on a case-by-case basis,41 ° this approach has also been used to adopt a per se rule of
exclusion for hypnosis testimony.41" ' A Multiple's testimony is unreliable hypnosis
when the defendant made a pretrial motion for a competency hearing under Federal Rule of Evidence
104), aff'd, 670 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1982).
405. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[t][b], at 601-11 n.6.
406. See United States v. Gomez, 807 F.2d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1986).
407. WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[l][c][i], at 601-11; see also FED. R. EVID. 401
("[R]elevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence.").
408. See United States v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1984) (using Rule 403 to determine
whether the probative value of hypnotic testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice); Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986) (noting that "[tihe Frye standard is
essentially a 'prejudice-versus-probative value test' similar to Evidence Rule 403" for purposes of
addressing the admissibility of hypnosis testimony); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 194-95 (Fla. 1989)
(utilizing Rule 403 to carefully weigh the probative value of hypnosis testimony against the dangers of
unfair prejudice); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. 1980) (ruling that whether a witness's
memory is hypnotically refreshed is a factor in determining whether the witness may testify). But see
United States v. Gatto, 924 F.2d 491, 500-01 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding hypnosis testimony using Federal Rule of Evidence 403),
409. FED. R. EvID. 403. Courts have also determined that a witness's testimony may be excluded
for failing to meet minimum standards of credibility: (1) when the witness is incapable of telling the
truth; (2) when the witness does not have the capacity to accurately recall; or (3) when the prejudice
caused by the testimony would be greater than the probative value. See, e.g., Ramirez, 871 F.2d at 584;
United States v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1984); Odom, 736 F.2d at 109-16.
410. See Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1122 (8th Cir. 1985).
411. See Contreras, 718 P.2d at 137-38.
testimony, and should be per se excluded on two grounds. First, the Multiple's
testimony fails to meet the Frye standard, a standard that should be applied to a
Multiple's testimony.412 Second, the probative value of a Multiple's testimony is
minimal at best, in contrast to the extreme prejudice that arises if a Multiple is
permitted to testify.413 Either of these grounds, standing alone, is sufficient to support
a per se exclusion of a Multiple's testimony.
A. A Multiple's Testimony Fails to Meet the Frye Scientific Evidentiary
Standard
Application of the Frye test to a Multiple's testimony, although it might seem
unusual, is appropriate because of the nature of MPD. As previously discussed, an
overwhelming majority of courts apply the Frye test to hypnosis testimony.4 14 Self-
hypnosis is the primary mechanism of MPD, therefore, courts should make the
connection between hypnosis testimony and MPD testimony. If courts choose not
to apply the Frye standard to a Multiple's testimony, they will be divorcing the
testimony from the underlying scientific technique of hypnosis which shaped it.4 5
When a Multiple testifies, his testimony relates his experiences while in a
dissociative state created by the abuse of self-hypnosis.4"6 When a particular alter is
out, the alter's reality is perceived in a self-hypnotic state. This self-hypnotic state
can be likened to an individual who wears glasses. Once the individual puts the
glasses on, he visually perceives the world around him through those glasses. Thus,
the glasses are an integral part of the way that person perceives the world. The
glasses do not literally create the world, which exists independently from the
individual's perceptions, yet they mold the way the individual sees the world, which
may or may not be accurate. For example, an incorrect prescription leads to distorted
perceptions. Accordingly, in order to understand and evaluate the reliability of a
Multiple's testimony, one cannot separate that testimony from the underlying
hypnotic state which shaped the Multiple's perceptions. Courts that fail to make the
connection between hypnosis testimony and a Multiple's testimony are doing just
412. See infra notes 414-22 and accompanying text.
413. See infra notes 423-592 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 119-38 and accompanying text.
415. Some might argue that if the Frye test applies to MPD, then it must apply to all other physical
and mental disorders which affect memory. Such an argument lacks merit. A Multiple's testimony
must meet the Frye test because it is hypnosis testimony. Other disorders which do not have hypnosis
as their primary mechanism need not necessarily meet the Frye standard.
416. An overwhelming majority of lawsuits involving a Multiple as a party or witness deal with the
Multiple's own criminal conduct or a third party's abuse of a Multiple. See, e.g., Wall v. Fairview
Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 400 (Minn. 1998). Under either scenario, the criminal
conduct or abuse takes place when the Multiple is in a dissociative state. For example, in situations of
abuse, the Multiple is usually abused when a child alter or some other alter is present. See supra notes
36-76 and accompanying text.
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that.
When determining whether to apply Frye to hypnosis testimony, courts
recognize that "[tlhe basic question is not so much whether the process is scientific
but rather whether a jury can realistically evaluate the effect of hypnosis." '417 The
question for the court confronted with a Multiple is the same as the question facing
a court confronted with a non-Multiple presenting hypnosis testimony; namely, can
the jurors "realistically evaluate the effects of hypnosis on testimony developed
through hypnosis[?] '"' The answer to this question is no. Courts should refuse to
adopt a rule that pennits each party to offer expert testimony on the effects of
hypnosis. Such a rule would be time-consuming, expensive, and would lead to
inconsistent results. This "is precisely what the Frye test seeks to avoid." '419 In
addition, expert testimony in this area is futile because there is no general acceptance
by experts in the field that hypnosis reliably assists a witness in accurately recalling
his memories. 2 Because the purpose of the Frye test is to conserve judicial
resources and to assure that "juries will not be misled by unproven, unsound
'scientific' procedures," Multiples should not be permitted to testify.42'
Further, if courts determine on a case-by-case basis whether Multiples should
testify, their decisions will lead to inconsistent results, and thwart the Frye test's
goals of assuring fairness and uniformity of decision-making. 22 Instead, courts
should use the Frye test to per se exclude a Multiple's testimony.
B. A Multiple's Testimony is Always More Prejudicial Than Probative
Three safeguards for testimony have evolved from the Anglo-American tradition.
These safeguards were developed to encourage witnesses to try their best to be
accurate in their testimony. 23 In addition, these safeguards were created to expose
any "inaccuracies in perception, memory or narration, deliberate or otherwise, which
nevertheless persist."' The three safeguards are the oath, cross-examination, and
the jury's firsthand observation of the witness. 2 These three safeguards are also the
rationale behind the presumption of witness competency embodied in Federal Rule
417. See Commonwealth v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (Mass. 1983).
418. See id. at 1195-96.
419. Id. at 1196.
420. See id.
421. See Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 135 (Alaska 1986).
422. See id.
423. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 14.01 [1], at 14-3; 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
VICrOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6011, at 124, 127 (1990).
424. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 14.01[1], at 14-3.
425. See id.
of Evidence 601 .426 Unfortunately, none of these safeguards are sufficient to ensure
reliability when applied to a Multiple's testimony. Therefore, a Multiple's testimony
will always be far more prejudicial than probative, and should be excluded per se.4"
1. The Oath is an Inadequate Safeguard to Ensure Reliability
A witness's ability to understand the oath is a threshold of minimum competency
to be determined by the court.428 Federal Rule of Evidence 603 states that "[b]efore
testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify
truthfully, by oath or affirmation, administered in a form calculated to awaken the
witness' conscience and impress that witness' mind with the duty to do So. ' 4 29 The
oath is an inadequate safeguard to assure reliable testimony from a Multiple for two
reasons. First, most Multiples are unable to comprehend the nature of an oath or
affirmation requiring them to tell the truth.43° Second, because each witness must be
sworn, the oath requirement will result in extreme delay and confusion when applied
to a Multiple with numerous personalities. 431' The probative value of a Multiple's
testimony is minimal and will always be outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
Consequently, courts should per se exclude a Multiple's testimony.
a. Inability to Comprehend the Nature of the Oath
In order to testify, a witness must be able to comprehend the nature of the oath,
and understand the obligation to tell the truth.432 However, most alter personalities
are unable to meet these requirements. Many Multiples have alter personalities of
children or infants; some have demonic alters such as "Satan, 433 or even substance-
426. See id.
427. The author recognizes a balancing approach is normally used on a case-by-case basis to
determine the admissibility of testimony. However, the balancing approach has also been used to adopt
a per se exclusion of hypnosis testimony. See Contreras, 718 P.2d at 137-38. The author advocates
using the same balancing approach to fashion a per se exclusion of a Multiple's testimony.
428. See State v. Gutman, 725 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1984) (acknowledging that incapacity to tell
the truth or appreciate the significance of the oath remain valid grounds for witness disqualification);
United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 109-16 (4th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the grounds for witness
disqualification are lack of personal knowledge, lack of capacity to recall, and failure to understand the
duty to testify truthfully); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[1 ] [c] [ii], at 601-12 (noting
that the "inability of a witness to comprehend an oath ... will allow a judge to exclude that person's
testimony").
429. FED. R. EvrD. 603.
430. In cases where the Multiple is the witness, it is often the child personality that is needed to
testify. Thus, the question arises whether a child alter can fully understand the nature of the oath or the
affirmation requiring him to tell the truth.
431. For example, should the witness be treated as a single person with the oath administered once,
or should each alter personality be separately sworn and questioned regarding their duty to testify
truthfully?
432. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 603.04, at 603-9 (noting that the oath requirement
is a facet of competency that is a question for the court).
433. See BuSS, supra note 12, at 129.
236
[Vol. 27: 193, 2000] The Unreliability of Testimony from a Witness With MPD
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
abuser alters.43" It is highly likely that one of these alter's testimony will be the
central focus of the litigation or prosecution. For example, in most physical, sexual,
or psychological abuse cases, the traumatic experiences are delegated to, and
experienced by a child or an infant alter that the Multiple created to deal with the
abuse.43 5 Therefore, this same child or infant alter would be needed as a witness in
litigation regarding the abuse.436 However, most young children and infants are
unable to comprehend the nature of an oath requiring them to tell the truth.
b. Extreme Delay and Confusion
Because each witness must be sworn, the oath requirement will result in extreme
delay and confusion when applied to a Multiple. The oath or affirmation must be
"administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress
the witness' mind with the duty" to testify truthfully."37 Federal Rule of Evidence
603 requires the court to assure that each testifying witness is sworn, and that each
witness appreciates the obligation to testify truthfully.438 A critical issue is whether
the Multiple should be treated as a single witness with the oath administered once,
or whether the Multiple should be treated as several witnesses, each subject to being
sworn separately. 439 If a court treats a Multiple as a single witness, it is highly likely
that only the alter "out" at the time the oath is administered will be aware of it.' 3
Therefore, although it has been argued that it is therapeutically beneficial for the
individual Multiple to be treated as a single witness in court," this is ineffective
from a legal standpoint.
When a Multiple first takes the stand, the personality that is "out" at that time
will be sworn, and questioned concerning his understanding of the obligation to tell
the truth. Although the alter who was "out" may have appreciated his obligation to
434. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 107-13.
435. See Buss, supra note 12, at 125-26.
436. See, e.g., Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395,409 (Minn. 1998); see
also PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 122 (acknowledging that alter personalities typically demonstrate a wide
range of cognitive abilities). For example, many child personalities have difficulty communicating with
their therapists because of an apparent difficulty in understanding ideas and language. See id.
437. See FED. R. EviD. 603. In addition to achieving maximum efficacy of the oath, "the oath should
be administered to each witness [when he takes] the stand, not to all of the witnesses as a group and not
in advance." See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 603.05, at 603-10.
438. See FED. R. Evuw. 603.
439. In addition to separately administering the oath to each alter, it is interesting to note that
"[slome experts question whether different personalities should have separate legal counsel and make
separate pleas and arguments." See Fields, supra note 3, at 280 n.123.
440. See Buss, supra note 12, at 131. Alter personalities not "out" may have amnesia during that
time. See id.
441. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 103.
testify truthfully, there is no guarantee that the other alters were aware of the same
obligation." 2  If these other alters were not separately sworn and questioned
concerning their obligation to testify truthfully, the court runs the risk of violating
Federal Rule of Evidence 603.44 Confronted with this dilemma, courts that have
permitted Multiples to testify have treated them as several witnesses for purposes of
the oath requirement.4  These courts administered the oath separately to each alter
as it emerged during the Multiple's testimony."' This results in extreme delay,
confuses the jury, and is a logistical nightmare.
The average Multiple has approximately thirteen personalities and may have as
many as several hundred." 6 Administering the oath to each of these personalities
could take an enormous amount of time, and would cause significant delay in the
trial. Certainly, it would require the court's and jurors' utmost patience, particularly
if the Multiple's several alters were constantly switching. Under such circumstances,
the court would have to reaffirm that the alter who is "out" understands that he is
under oath and must testify truthfully. The court's only alternative is to treat the
Multiple as a single person and swear him in on one occasion. Such an approach
would violate Federal Rule of Evidence 603. For these reasons, the only acceptable
solution is to exclude the Multiple's testimony per se:
2. Cross-Examination is an Inadequate Safeguard to Ensure Reliability
The cross-examination of [a] witness is one of the safeguards of accuracy and
truthfulness. It is well settled that when a witness has been examined in chief, the
other party has the right to cross-examine for the purpose of ascertaining and
exhibiting the situation of the witness with respect to the parties and to the subject
of the litigation[,] uncovering his interest, his motive, his inclinations, his prejudices,
his means of obtaining a correct and certain knowledge of the facts .. .and his
powers of discernment, memory and description."7
442. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 148 (explaining that most alter personalities would not feel as great
a responsibility for another alter's testimony).
443. In essence, the court would be permitting an alter to testify without having been sworn and
without ascertaining whether the alter fully comprehended the nature of his obligation to tell the truth.
444. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 229 n.1 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that this
procedure is a "logical way to deal with a difficult and unique situation"). The court in State v.
Johnson, No. 90-CF-280 (Winnebago County Ct., Wis. Nov. 8, 1990) dealt with the administration of
the oath to a Multiple witness by summoning six different personalities and swearing in each personality
as it appeared. This could be an enormous time constraint on the court when a Multiple has several
personalities and is constantly switching.
445. See, e.g., Dorsey, 426 S.E.2d at 229 n.1.
446. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 123.
447. Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, Cross-Examination of Witness as to His Mental State or
Condition, to Impeach Competency or Credibility, 44 A.L.R.3D 1203, 1207 (1973). "Almost any
emotional or mental defect may materially affect the accuracy of testimony; a conservative list of such
defects would have to include the psychoses, most or all of the neuroses, defects in the structure of the
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The right to impeach a witness by cross-examination is universally recognized." 8
However, the cross-examination of a Multiple does not assure the accuracy and
truthfulness of his testimony for six reasons. First, a Multiple is highly suggestible.
Second, a Multiple confabulates. Third, a Multiple experiences memory hardening.
Fourth, a Multiple's mind is compartmentalized. Fifth, a Multiple experiences
switching. And sixth, a Multiple's psychotherapy records are protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. Any of these six reasons, standing alone, makes
a Multiple's testimony highly prejudicial. This prejudice, when balanced against the
testimony's minimal probative value, should lead courts to exclude a Multiple's
testimony per se.
a. High Suggestibility
Cross-examination will not assure the accuracy and truthfulness of a Multiple's
testimony because a Multiple is subject to suggestion. This defect in a Multiple's
testimony cannot be cured because hypnosis is necessarily a state of heightened
suggestibility. 9 In traditional hypnosis, the hypnotist's suggestions control each step
of the hypnotism process.45 "The patient's dissociated attention is constantly
sensitive to and responsive to cues from the hypnotist."45' The process is nearly
identical for a Multiple with one exception: A Multiple's hypnotic dissociation is not
brought about by a hypnotist, but by self-hypnosis.45 2 Nevertheless, these experi-
ences are similar, if not identical to those that have been induced by hypnotists. The
Multiple is subject to the same level of heightened suggestibility which can result in
nervous system, mental deficiency.... and psychopathic personality." Id. at 1207-08. Clearly, "[tihe
need for psychiatric evaluation of testimony is one of the most important problems in forensic
psychiatry and a fertile field for the application of behavioral science insights to the legal process. It
may be difficult, if not impossible, for the untrained observer to detect some forms of psychological
illnesses in the demeanor or social attitude of a mentally disturbed witness." Id.
448. See id. at 1209.
449. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 410 (Minn. 1998);
Gruenewald, supra note 12, at 186.
450. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 333 (observing that even a skilled hypnotist cannot avoid
implanting suggestions in the mind of a hypnotized subject).
451. Id. (stating that "[h]ypnosis can be described as an altered state of intense and sensitive
interpersonal relatedness between hypnotist and patient, characterized by the patient's nonrational
submission and relative abandonment of executive control to a more or less regressive, dissociative state
452. See Gruenewald, supra note 12, at 182 n.9 (observing that "in the case of self-hypnosis, a three-
way split may be tentatively proposed, with one part exercising the function usually assumed by the
hypnotist").
fabricated false memories. 53 Furthermore, Multiples most often are treated for their
disease with hypnotic therapy. When seeking treatment, the Multiple is again subject
to the heightened levels of suggestibility created by the hypnotism process induced
by the therapist. 54 Therefore, because the crux of MPD is the abuse of self-hypnosis,
and because treatment of the MPD patient also requires hypnotic therapy, Multiples
have double exposure to hypnosis and heightened suggestibility.
The implantation of suggestions in the mind of a Multiple cannot be avoided,
even through the exercise of skill and attention. 55 Suggestive messages are often
nonverbal and the cues are often so minute that even a trained observer is not
cognizant of them.456 Moreover, a hypnosis subject, such as a Multiple, responds
remarkably to explicit suggestions as well as implicit ones.457 It is possible that a
Multiple could respond to a therapist's implicit and unintentional cues such as his
attitude, demeanor, tone of voice, and body language.458 For example, a therapist
who is frustrated may inadvertently sigh or speak in a stem tone of voice, causing a
Multiple in a hypnotic state to change his response to an earlier question in the hope
of pleasing the therapist. 59, A Multiple undergoing therapy generally aims to please
his therapist, and so it follows that the experiences recalled during hypnotic therapy
may have been generated to serve the purpose of the session.46 A Multiple's high
suggestibility and desire to please his therapist leads to the problems of confabulation
and memory hardening. 6' Thus, the implantation of suggestion in the mind of a
Multiple is common and cannot be avoided.
An attorney cross-examining a Multiple will be unable to uncover false
suggestions implanted in the Multiple's mind. 62 Cross-examination of a Multiple is
an ineffective means of revealing the implantation of false suggestions because there
is no way to determine with certainty whether such falsity was introduced by the
hypnotic process.463 Even a Multiple who has accepted a post-hypnotic suggestion
453. Some might argue that if a conventional eyewitness's testimony, which is subject to grave
inaccuracies and distortion, is admissible in court in spite of its potential unreliability, then a Multiple's
testimony should also be admissible. This logic is deceptive. It may be true that a conventional
eyewitness's testimony is subject to inaccuracy, however, witnesses whose testimony is shaped by
hypnosis, such as Multiples, are a great deal more vulnerable to suggestion than the normal person. For
such witnesses, the hypnotic distortions persist into the post-hypnotic period with much more force.
See Diamond, supra note 359, at 342.
454. See id. at 333.
455. See id.
456. See id. (stating that most hypnotic subjects will be responsive to such cues because they desire
to please the hypnotist).
457. See id.
458. See id. (identifying that the nature of these cues may be quite obscure to the hypnotist, to the
subject, and even to the trained observer).
459. See id.
460. See id.
461. See id. at 335, 337.
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to forget aspects of the hypnotic procedure will generally remain unaware of the
source of the statements he makes while testifying.'6 Moreover, the fabrications that
occur during self-hypnosis or induced hypnosis will be honest in the sense that the
Multiple is not aware that he is fabricating memories .'9
b. Confabulation
Cross-examination of a Multiple cannot assure reliability because a Multiple is
unable to restrict his memory to accurate facts, free from fantasies and
confabulation.' Every Multiple develops a compensatory process that helps him
deal with missing information and gaps in memory. 7 This process is known as
confabulation. Confabulation is an unconscious compensatory process in which gaps
in memory are filled through the insertion of imagined experiences that the Multiple
believes to be real.46 8 Moreover, the mind of a Multiple is extraordinary in the sense
that a Multiple can confabulate about imaginary experiences that he believed went
on for long periods of time, perhaps even weeks or months. 9 A Multiple will often
remember specifics of a fabricated event because the imaginary events contain
portions of real memories.470 A Multiple will express confidence in the accuracy of
his recovered memories, however, this confidence does not guarantee the accuracy
of the memory.471
With confabulation, the Multiple awakens from dissociation and is unable to
recognize that some of his own thoughts might be implanted or fantasized; in other
464. See id. at 333-34. Misperceptions created by hypnosis "will withstand the most vigorous cross-
examination." See id. at 334.
465. See id. at 333-34.
466. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 410 (Minn. 1998)
(acknowledging that inaccurate information can be recalled by a Multiple during dissociative episodes).
Hypnotically recalled memory consists of: "(1) appropriate actual events; (2) entirely irrelevant actual
events; (3) pure fantasy; and (4) fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole." See Diamond,
supra note 359, at 335.
467. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 335. The gaps in memories are often filled with details that
are portions of real memories, "but ones unrelated to the situation that the hypnosis seeks to probe."
See id.
468. See Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock, Typical Signs and Symptoms of Psychiatric illness,
in COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 499, 501 (Kaplan & Sadock eds., 4th ed. 1985).
469. See Jacqueline R. Kanovitz et al., Witnesses with Multiple Personality Disorder, 23 PEPP. L.
REV. 387, 426 (1996).
470. See Buss, supra note 12, at 77 (noting that Muliples tend to confuse memories of fantasies
with memories of real events); Diamond, supra note 359, at 335 (observing that hypnotic subjects who
confabulate do not recognize that they are making errors in recall).
471. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 78-81 (explaining that hypnotic memories are often mistaken as
real events).
words, the Multiple does not know the inaccuracy of his thoughts.472 The Multiple's
unwarranted belief that his thoughts are accurate is further enhanced because
following a hypnotic state, mental processes are rationalized and experienced as the
product of free will although they are not.473 Cross-examination is inadequate to
ascertain which portions of a Multiple's testimony are factually accurate, as opposed
to confabulated details used to fill in missing gaps of memory. Without this
knowledge, the cross-examination of a Multiple is ineffective to uncover those
portions of the Multiple's testimony which are the unreliable product of confabula-
tion.
c. Memory Hardening
Cross-examination of a Multiple is also ineffective due to memory hardening.474
Memory hardening is referred to as "unshakeable recall." '475 A Multiple believes that
his recall is accurate because he can recall with amazing detail and verisimilitude.476
Furthermore, because a Multiple witness has such a firm belief in his memories,
thoughts, and feelings, it is extremely difficult to persuade him otherwise.477 The
enhanced confidence in a hypnotic memory is known as memory hardening.47
Memory hardening causes a Multiple to passionately attest to the veracity of his
confabulated memories, thoughts or feelings which are the product of suggestion or
fantasy.479 Therefore, despite his serious impairment, a Multiple makes a surprisingly
convincing witness. A witness with memory hardening has the uncanny ability to
persuade people, especially jurors, that his statements are accurate.8 This is true
even when a Multiple's stories are improbable and contrary to established facts.4"'
472. See id. (noting that a hypnosis subject may believe fully in his recalled hypnotic experiences).
473. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 334. During one hypnosis session, a psychotherapist
suggested to the patient that he should open a window when the psychotherapist cleaned his glasses.
See id. The patient awoke. See id. When the psychotherapist began cleaning his glasses, the patient
opened the window. See id. When the subject was asked why he opened the window, he answered, "I
felt warm and I wanted to let some air in." See id. This response indicated that the patient had no
awareness that the suggestion was implanted. See id. Further, the patient believed that it was his own
idea to open the window, and began to rationalize his belief and action. See id. Thus, the patient
confabulated the reason he opened the window. See id.
474. See Wall v. Fairview Hosp. & Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395, 410 (Minn. 1998).
475. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 336.
476. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 78-81.
477. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 334. For example, Sirhan Sirhan was hypnotized in an effort
to restore his memory of the assassination of Robert Kennedy. See id. Sirhan persisted in his
conviction that he had never succumbed to the hypnosis, although he repeatedly went into deep trances
during which he was extremely susceptible to post-hypnotic suggestions. See id.
478. See Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995) (labeling a subject's enhanced
confidence in his hypnotic recall as memory hardening).
479. See BUSS, supra note 12, at 78-81.
480. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 339-40 (noting that a jury might rely on a witness's
uncertainty when apportioning the weight to give his testimony and that hypnosis has the ability to
remove doubts and uncertainty).
481. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 160-62.
242
[Vol. 27: 193, 2000] The Unreliability of Testimony from a Witness With MPD
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
An attorney conducting a cross-examination of a Multiple will have a very
difficult time because of memory hardening. For example, the Multiple's testimony
creates a substantial problem for the cross-examiner, judge, and jury because the
witness becomes an "honest liar" so to speak. Although the Multiple is convinced
of the veracity of his testimony, it may be complete confabulation derived from
suggestion or fantasy. Because jurors rely on indicators, such as uncertainty of recall
and demeanor,4"' the Multiple will have little or no problem deceiving a jury with
vividly detailed testimony, rationalized through confabulation, and made convincing
by an "unshakeable" attestation to its veracity.483
d. Compartmentalization
Cross-examination is an inadequate safeguard of reliability because Multiples
have compartmentalized minds. 4 Within the ordinary mind, experts have suggested
that memory banks are analogous to filing systems with "labeled, interconnected
receptacles[.]" '485 Without these receptacles, "information would be chaotic and
scattered, inaccessible to rapid retrieval."486 The Multiple's mind has this problem.
The fact that a Multiple's memories are scattered and often inaccessible is best
illustrated by comparing a Multiple's and non-Multiple's memory systems using an
analogy.
One can compare a Multiple's and a non-Multiple's memory systems to a typical
dresser used to store clothing. For the non-Multiple, imagine that each drawer in the
dresser represents a memory bank, storing particular types of similar information.
However, for the Multiple, each drawer represents a memory bank of a particular
alter personality.487 For both the non-Multiple and Multiple, assume that each item
of clothing in the drawer represents a distinct memory. The non-Multiple, when
storing clothes, would sort out his clothes and place particular items of clothing in
specific drawers. 8 For example, a non-Multiple might store important birth dates
in a particular memory bank. In this instance, if each shirt represented a particular
birth date then it would be stored with other shirts in a specific drawer. In essence,
482. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 601.03[2][a], at 601-13.
483. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 335-36, 339-40.
484. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 124-26 (analyzing a Multiple's complex personality structures);
Kanovitz, supra note 469, at 415 (noting that compartmentalization will challenge even the most
seasoned attorneys who cross-examine a Multiple).
485. See Buss, supra note 12, at 101:
486. See id.
487. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 103-04 (remarking that alter personalities are "highly discrete
states of consciousness").
488. See Buss, supra note 12, at 101.
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a non-Multiple's dresser would be comprised of well-organized drawers.489 One
drawer might contain undergarments, another might contain socks, and yet another
might contain shirts. When the non-Multiple needs access to his socks, undergar-
ments, or a particular shirt, he knows what drawer that particular item of clothing is
in and can easily retrieve it.4'
A Multiple's memories are difficult, if not impossible, to retrieve for several
reasons. First, a Multiple's memories are difficult to retrieve because particular types
of clothing are not organized and placed into specific drawers.49" ' Instead, clothes are
scattered amongst the drawers. For example, socks are mixed with undergarments
and shirts throughout the dresser. Moreover, particular pairs of socks may be split
amongst several drawers, illustrating the fact that a Multiple has fragmented
memories.492 Second, a Multiple's memories are scattered and difficult to retrieve
because a Multiple's knowledge of what items of clothing are contained in particular
drawers could range from comprehensive knowledge, to limited knowledge, to no
knowledge whatsoever.4 93 In other words, a particular alter would most likely have
knowledge of his own memories-the contents of his own drawer-or he may have
limited knowledge of memories which have been fragmented.494 However, his
knowledge of a fragmented memory might not include awareness of where the other
portions of the fragmented memory are stored.495 Additionally, a particular alter may
be completely unaware that a specific memory exists.4 96 Therefore, a cross-examiner
must interrogate every alter to locate one particular memory. This is analogous to
searching and sifting through every drawer in the dresser to locate one particular item
of clothing. To complicate matters further, the dresser may have hidden compart-
ments or additional drawers that no one, including the Multiple, is aware exists. In
other words, a Multiple might have alter personalities that are hidden and may never
489. See id.
490. See id.
491. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 198-200.
492. See id. This sock analogy becomes even more complicated when a particular item of clothing
is fragmented and pieces of the item of clothing are stored in dozens of different drawers. In other
words, a certain memory could be fragmented amongst dozens of alter personalities. See id. at 198-99.
493. See BLIss, supra note 12, at 140-41; PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 114-15.
494. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 198-99.
495. See id. at 114-15, 198-99. A survey "found that three-quarters of MPD patients had at least one
personality who denied all knowledge of any other personalities[.]" Id. at 114-15. One problem that
a cross-examiner may have when dealing with a Multiple witness is that a particular event may have
been experienced by several different alters, each of them experiencing a distinct portion of the event,
but none of them experiencing the event in its entirety. For example, alter A may be able to give the
cross-examiner a detailed description about facts leading up to a particular event, and alter B may be
able to give the cross-examiner a detailed description of facts after the particular event in question, but
the actual experience of the event may be subdivided amongst alters C, D, E, and F. Therefore, if each
alter were cross-examined, with the exception of alter F, the cross-examination would be incomplete
and ineffective. Unfortunately, there is no effective means to determine with accuracy which alter
personalities possess the information the cross-examiner seeks to uncover.
496. See id. at 114.
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emerge.4 97 This makes it virtually impossible to have complete access to a Multiple's
memories. The cross-examiner would have no way of knowing whether these hidden
compartments or additional drawers even exist.4 98
Third, a Multiple's memories are scattered and difficult to retrieve because, in
the course of a Multiple's treatment, a psychotherapist will inevitably probe and sift
through the drawers in an attempt to reorganize and match garments.499 The
psychotherapist does so in an attempt to restore fragmented memories and to integrate
the memories of each alter personality within the system."° The psychotherapist is
trying to place particular items of clothing into their proper drawers. In essence,
psychotherapists are attempting to group and organize the memories by placing them
in the appropriate memory bank."' Unfortunately, this complicates memory retrieval,
and distorts the accuracy of memories. 0 2 For example, by attempting to reorganize
the dresser, a psychotherapist will sometimes unknowingly place an item of clothing
into an improper drawer. To make matters worse" a psychotherapist could take one
sock and match it with a different sock in an attempt to make a matching pair.
However, many socks, although they appear similar, are not a precise match. The
psychotherapist would be gathering fragments of a memory that are mismatched, and
by combining them, a completely inaccurate memory can be formed.
e. Switching
Cross-examination is also ineffective due to the problem of switching.
Switching is the process of changing from one alter personality to another, and is a
core behavioral phenomenon in MPD patients." 3 The alter personality present before
497. See Buss, supra note 12, at 138.
498. This exact problem was encountered by counsel in Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 226 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992). In Dorsey, counsel was unable to cross-examine a key alter personality because the
existence of the personality was not discovered until after trial. See id.
499. See Loftus, supra note 382, at 110. During treatment, therapists often use a variety of tools to
help reorganize and match memories, a process known as integration. See id. These tools and
techniques have the potential for creating pseudo-memories. See id. In addition, many of these tools
do not have legitimate scientific standards for validity and more importantly, have not been declared
reliable by the psychiatric community. See id. These tools include suggestion, social contagion,
misdiagnosis, and the misapplication of hypnosis, dream work, and regressive therapies. See id.
500. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 198-200 (explaining the process a Multiple's therapist uses to
assemble whole memories from fragments).
501. Seeid. at ll5.
502. See Kluft, supra note 76, at 230-33 (discussing problems associated with the use of hypnosis
to treat Multiples).
503. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 117 (recognizing that any mental health specialist who hopes to
successfully treat a Multiple must become skilled at recognizing switches).
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the switch is replaced by another personality. °4 "[S]witches tend to be triggered by
environmental cues or internal conflicts, and are experienced as being out of
volitional control[.] '5 °5 However, it is important to recognize that switching is a
psycho-physiological process, and some Multiples will have control over switches
to particular alters, but no control over switches to others."° In fact, "[iun times of
stress, .. .alter personalities may emerge who are inappropriate to the situation[.] " 7
The switching of alter personalities can be overt or covert."° "The latter can be
extremely difficult to detect, and it is only after one has observed a number of overt
switches that covert switching is likely to be recognized.. '5°. "The actual moment of
switching can last from fractions of a second to several minutes or even longer[.]"51 °
Alters may be present for only brief moments."' Most switches are "signaled by a
blink or upward roll of the eyes.... [or] a rapid fluttering of the eyelids."5"2 Other
signals may include "bodily twitches, shudders, or abrupt changes in posture." '513 In
addition, Multiples may go into a trance-like state or even have a convulsion that is
similar to a seizure. 14 However, some Multiples have "learned to disguise or cover
up switching behavior. ' 51
5
As demonstrated above, the switching process is very complex. Moreover, some
Multiples have the ability to hide their multiplicity, dealing with situations using
several different alters." 6 This uniquely complex ability creates several problems
during the cross-examination of a Multiple. One problem is that Multiples may
switch uncontrollably during cross-examination. There is no doubt that a courtroom
can be a stressful place for anyone, particularly a witness on the stand. Multiples
often react to stressful situations by uncontrollable switching. 17 This uncontrollable
switching will create chaos, resulting in an ineffective cross-examination due to
questioning of the wrong alter or the inability to fully question a particular alter.
Another problem is that opposing counsel may be unable to call forth a particular
alter. This exact situation arose in State v. Donnelly.51 In Donnelly, the defendant
504. See id. In some cases, two personalities are present at the same time. See id.
505. Id.; see also BLISS, supra note 12, at 125 (commenting that the "'spontaneous' transformation
of the alert patient into a personality usually occurs when the patient encounters a stress with which he
... cannot cope").
506. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 117.
507. Id. at 118.
508. See id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 120.
511. See id. at 121.
512. Id. at 120-21.
513. See id. at 121.
514. See id.
515. See id.
516. Seeid. at 118.
517. Seeid. atll7.
518. 798 P.2d 89 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (1991).
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was convicted of sexual abuse of his adopted daughter, Janey Doe. 19 Janey Doe
suffered from MPD.5 2 The defendant claimed that two of Janey Doe's alters would
have testified inconsistently with her accusations.5 2' However, those alters were
never questioned because they did not emerge at trial. 2 2 Because these alters never
emerged, defense counsel was unable to effectively cross-examine Janey Doe. 23
Thus, if a particular alter personality is not present on the stand, the cross-examiner
will be unable to thoroughly explore that alter's testimony in order to attack his
credibility.
The third problem that arises during cross-examination is that counsel often will
be unable to recognize when switches occur in personalities that are being cross-
examined. 4 The cross-examiner's ability to recognize a switch between two alter
personalities is influenced.by four factors.
First, if the cross-examiner has a limited knowledge of psychotherapy, it is likely
that he is unfamiliar with the mechanics of switching. 25 Therefore, he is less likely
to recognize when a switch takes place. Second, the cross-examiner's ability to
recognize when a switch has occurred will depend on his degree of access to the
Multiple's psychotherapy records. If he does not have access to the records, it is
unlikely that he will be able to recognize when a switch occurs.
Third, the cross-examiner may not recognize that a switch has occurred if there
is little difference between the former alter and the newly emerged alter. 26 If the
change is dramatic, such as a change from female to male, or child to adult, the cross-
examiner will readily recognize that a switch has taken place. However, if the change
is a subtle one, and the newly emerged alter is similar to the former alter, the switch
will be much more difficult to detect.
Fourth, if the cross-examiner has little or no familiarity or past experience with
the Multiple's alters, it is possible that he will be unaware that a switch has taken
place. The more familiar the cross-examiner is with the Multiple's alters, the more
likely he will recognize when a switch occurs.5 27 For each of these reasons, switching
519. Seeid. at91.
520. See id.
521. See id. at 94.
522. See id.
523. The court ruled, however, that the mere fact that Janey Doe was cross-examined was sufficient,
regardless of whether these alters actually emerged. See id. at 93-94.
524. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 118.
525. See id. (opining that covert switches can be recognized only after a person has spent an
extraordinary amount of time with the Multiple).
526. See id.
527. See id. It is only after therapists came to know alter personalities over an extended period of
time, that "they developed an ability to distinguish them more easily and to discern greater degrees of
differences among them." See id.
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makes the cross-examination of a Multiple ineffective.
f Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Most Multiple's psychotherapy records are inaccessible to counsel because of
the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 28 The common law psychotherapist privilege
was first recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond.529 All
fifty states and the District of Columbia have adopted some form of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 3 However, some states qualify the privilege and
subject it to a balancing test.53' When balancing, if "the evidentiary need for the
disclosure of the contents of a patient's counseling sessions outweighs that patient's
privacy interests," then the record will be disclosed.532 It is important to recognize
that a defendant's counsel cannot effectively cross-examine the Multiple without
access to the clinical records, therefore, the probative value of the information
contained in those records is substantial.
The cross-examiner will need the Multiple's psychotherapy records to attack the
Multiple's credibility on cross-examination. These records are essential for several
reasons. First, these records permits the opposition to evaluate the extent to which
the therapy process itself may have suggested or implanted unsubstantiated or
unverifiable memories and beliefs.533 Second, these records are necessary for the
cross-examiner to understand the internal model and make-up of the Multiple's
personality system. The records typically reveal the number of alter personalities,
their names, ages, traits, functions, and particular experiences revealed during
528. See, e.g., State v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 91-94 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (1991). The psychotherapist-patient privilege serves three purposes. First,
the privilege serves the interest of the patient because it is intended to inspire confidence in the patient
and to encourage him to make full disclosure of his symptoms to the psychotherapist. See WEINSTEIN
& BERGER, supra note 384, § 504.03[4] [a], at 504-10. Further, it prevents the physician from making
public certain information that would possibly result in the humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace of
the patient. See id. The second important public interest served by the privilege is the facilitation of
treatment for individuals suffering the effects of a mental or emotional problem. See id. Finally, the
privilege promotes confidential conversations between psychotherapist and patient, which would be
curtailed if the privilege did not exist. See id. There are three reasons why ethical and seasoned
psychotherapists are sensitive to the importance of confidentiality in psychotherapy. See FED. R. EViD.
504 advisory committee's notes. First, the success of the treatment directly reflects on the quality of
the patient/therapist relationship. See id. Second, ethical guidelines published throughout the
profession require clinicians to safeguard patient confidentiality and to disclose information only when
permitted or explicitly demanded by law. See id. Finally, in most jurisdictions, mental health records
are protected by the privilege of confidentiality. See id.
529. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
530. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 504.03[4][b], at 504-11 n. 12.
531. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 7005 (West 1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19
(1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.7 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-400.2 (Michie 1992).
532. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 504.04, at 504-14.
533. See Kluft, supra note 76, at 230-33; see also Diamond, supra note 359, at 333 (emphasizing
that a hypnotist cannot avoid implanting suggestions in the mind of a hypnotized subject).
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therapy."3 Third, Multiples commonly switch from one alter to another, covertly or
overtly, usually in response to certain stimuli or "triggers.'53  Access to the
psychotherapist's records provides important insights regarding how to best
effectuate the switch. There may be circumstances when the cross-examiner will
need to trigger a switch in the Multiple from one alter personality to another in order
to attack that particular alter's credibility. The cross-examiner must know that this
overt or covert switching can take place, and how to recognize it when it occurs. The
fact that these records are privileged makes effective cross-examination of a Multiple
impossible.
3. The Jury's Observation is an Inadequate Safeguard to Ensure
Reliability
Courts have long recognized that the jury's observation is a traditional safeguard
to assure the reliability of testimony. 36 In fact, the presumption of witness
competency that underlies Federal Rule of Evidence 601 is based, in part, on the
belief that the jury is best equipped to assess the credibility of a witness and the
witness's reliability based on their observations.537 However, the jury's observations
are insufficient to assess the reliability of a Multiple's testimony for several reasons.
First, the jury may falsely presume that hypnosis improves the accuracy of
memory.538 Second, the jury may be deceived by a witness faking the condition. 3 9
Third, the jury will be unable to understand the complexity of a Multiple's
personality system.' Fourth, the jury will be unable to assess the reliability of a
Multiple's testimony because a Multiple's demeanor exudes self-confidence and
credibility. 4' Each of these reasons, standing alone, makes the testimony of a
Multiple more prejudicial than probative.
a. False Presumption that Hypnosis Improves the Accuracy of Memory
There is a false presumption among the general public that hypnosis improves
the accuracy of memory. Because of this presumption, ajury composed of members
534. See infra notes 556-587 and accompanying text.
535. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 117-18.
536. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 14.01 [1], at 14-2; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note
423, § 6011, at 124, 127.
537. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 14.01[1], at 14-2 (noting that "the trier of fact
can more accurately evaluate credibility if it can observe the witness' demeanor while testifying").
538. See infra notes 542-50 and accompanying text.
539. See infra notes 551-55 and accompanying text.
540. See infra notes 556-87 and accompanying text.
541. See infra notes 588-92 and accompanying text.
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of the public will be unable to assess the reliability of a Multiple's testimony. 2
Most Multiples undergo hypnotic therapy to treat their disorders. 43 Based on the
mistaken belief that hypnosis improves the accuracy of memory, mostjurors will give
undue weight to the Multiple's testimony. This public opinion is deceiving because
most research suggests that this belief is false.5" During a trial, the false presumption
that hypnosis improves the accuracy of memory will be strengthened further by
expert testimony. For instance, the Multiple's expert will express his conviction in
the truth and accuracy of the Multiple's recall. 45 The value of using expert testimony
to establish the reliability of a Multiple's testimony is minimal. 46 The accuracy of
hypnosis testimony is impossible to verify, even for an expert. 7 Because a Multiple
falls prey to the unrecognized abuse of self-hypnosis, no means exist to determine
whether his testimony is replete with falsities and distortions. 48
Many experts may be highly skilled as to the therapeutic and diagnostic uses of
hypnosis, yet they may have no insight into the complexity and operation of the legal
system. When an expert testifies that a Multiple's testimony is just as detailed,
coherent, and indistinguishable from the testimony of a non-Multiple, he is
proclaiming the testimony's accuracy. 49 However, even if the Multiple's testimony
has all the earmarks of accuracy, it still may be fantasy or the product of
suggestion.55
b. Faking the Condition
Through observation, a juror will be unable to tell if a Multiple is genuine or a
fake. " ' Moreover, even a skilled psychotherapist cannot detect whether an alleged
542. See Graham F. Wagstaff et al., The Effect of Hypnotically Elicited Testimony on Jurors'
Judgments of Guilt and Innocence, 132 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 591, 592 (1992) (explaining that research
stretching from countries such as the United States to the United Kingdom has indicated that this
presumption is widespread).
543. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 193-220; Kluft, supra note 76, at 230-33.
544. See Wagstaff et al., supra note 542, at 591 (commenting on the inaccuracy of survey data from
several countries indicating the belief that hypnosis increases the accuracy of an eyewitness's memory).
545. See, e.g., Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that "[t]here
was undisputed expert testimony at both trials that the victim in a dissociative state would not lie").
546. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1989) (asserting that "[iln this
era of increasing use of experts in both civil and criminal trials, the sad truth is that an 'expert' can be
found to testify on behalf of almost any viewpoint or position").
547. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 337. Those who attempt to verify the accuracy of hypnosis
testimony usually rely on such factors as detail, coherence, and compatibility with facts established from
other sources. See id. However, even if the testimony has all of these earmarks of accuracy, it still may




551. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 161 (asserting that a clever criminal can learn to fake MPD).
Despite this fact, at least one court has allowed the jury to determine, after listening to the experts,
whether the defendant genuinely had MPD or faked the condition. See State v. Darnall, 614 P.2d 120,
123-24 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
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Multiple is genuinely suffering from MPD or faking the disorder.552 Alter
personalities may be simulated."5 3 A witness who desires to deceive a jury or an
expert can study the MPD literature and learn how to fake the condition. 54
Furthermore, a witness faking MPD may feign all of the traditional symptoms of the
disorder with great skill.55 Thus, because hypnosis and MPD can be feigned, and
neither a lay juror nor a psychotherapist can detect that it is being feigned, a jury's
observation is insufficient to determine the reliability of an alleged Multiple's
testimony.
c. Complexity of the Multiple's Personality System
The jury's observation is inadequate to assure reliability because the personality
systems of Multiples are complex and beyond the understanding of a typical lay
juror.556 Psychotherapists have generated metaphors, maps, and diagrams to describe
the internal world of alter personalities.557 Psychotherapists have used three
particular metaphors to explain the complex personality structure of a Multiple.55
Regardless of which metaphor or internal model is used to explain the Multiple's
personality system, the jury must come to appreciate the particular Multiple's unique
metaphors or internal models in order to understand the Multiple's testimony.
The first system metaphor or internal model used by psychotherapists to explain
a Multiple's personality system is layering.5 59 Layering is a term used "to describe
a set of phenomena that many therapists find as they work through traumatic
materials with [the Multiple.]'5" Layering phenomena are one aspect of the
Multiple's defensive process of dissociation.56 ' Layering phenomena disassembles
552. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 161; see also Diamond, supra note 359, at 337 (recognizing
rigorous scientific experiments have repeatedly demonstrated that even the best experts cannot
consistently distinguish between actual and feigned hypnosis). The faking phenomenon is accurately
illustrated in the movie Primal Fear where Richard Gere stars as a defense attorney whose client is
believed to have MPD. PRIMAL FEAR (Paramount 1996). At the movie's end, it was revealed that the
client was faking the disorder, despite the fact that he successfully convinced his therapist, attorneys,
and the court that he suffered from the disorder. See id.
553. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 161.
554. See id. See generally Martin T. Ome, The Nature of Hypnosis: Artifact and Essence, 58 J.
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 277, 293-96 (1959) (discussing subjects faking hypnosis).
555. See BLISS, supra note 12, at 161.
556. See PUTNAM, supra note 8, at 123-26 (detailing the complexity of a Multiple's personality
system).
557. See id. at 210-11.
558. See id. at 124-26.
559. See id. at 124-25.
560. See id. at 124.
561. See id. at 125.
painful memories, making it difficult for the Multiple to remember them. 62 Layering
may also occur as alters "within the Multiple's system begin to fuse or integrate. 563
The personalities within the system may be described as layered because "certain
groups of personalities overlie each other, or are buried beneath other
personalities."5" It is possible for one overt personality to hide several covert active
personalities. 65 Due to the several layers of personality groups, it is conceivable that
specific details or memories are missing within the personality system.566 Thus, the
more personalities within a Multiple's system, the greater the potential for increased
levels of complexity. 67
The second unique system metaphor or internal model used by psychotherapists
to explain a Multiple's personality system is families. 68 Personalities may be
"related on the basis of sharing a common traumatic origin."569 In addition,
personalities may be related because their origins share a common alter. 7 ° Further,
"[p]ersonalities may be grouped together by the functions they perform[.]"' For
example, a Multiple may divide tasks requiring complex functions, such as a job,
among certain alters who perform the sub-tasks necessary to perform the particular
task. 72 These types of personalities which are grouped by task are also referred to
as a family." 3
It is highly probable that an alter in one family group will have no knowledge of
an alter in another family. 4 This is true even though a Multiple with a large number
of personalities may have several families residing within the personality system. 75
Moreover, when there are internal conflicts, one family may be at war with another
family. 7 6 Families have designated gatekeepers that serve as a means by which the
families communicate with each other within a personality system.577 It is often
difficult to reach certain members of a family because access may be denied unless
the gatekeeper alter is confronted. 8
On occasion, an attorney will need to question an alter within a particular family
562. See id.
563. See id.
564. See id. at 124.
565. See id.
566. See id. at 125.
567. See id.
568. See id. at 125-26.
569. Id. (explaining that "personalities within a group or family are generally more aware of each
other and have better access to [a] shared pool of memories or skills than personalities across families").
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which has a gatekeeper personality. The steps the attorney must take to accomplish
this illustrates the complexity of a Multiple's personality system. The attorney
seeking to question a particular alter must first ascertain what family that alter
belongs to, and who the gatekeeper personality is for that family.579 The gatekeeper
must usually be called forth before access to the particular family member alter will
be granted. 8° While all of this questioning is taking place, it is extremely improbable
that the average lay juror will understand what is taking place and why.
The last unique metaphor system or internal model used by psychotherapists to
explain a Multiple's personality system is the tree structure. 8' Tree structures within
Multiples have the same design as hierarchical relationships within a traditional
family tree.582 A typical tree structure has an "original or core personality at the top
or root vortex, branching downward to other personalities." '583 The other personali-
ties split and branch downward again into more personalities."M The bottom
branches of the tree consist of the currently active personalities.585
Most psychotherapists recognize that the use of detailed maps, diagrams, and
blueprints are essential to assemble information about a Multiple's personality
system.586 Even with such charts and diagrams, there is no guarantee that a
psychotherapist will accurately depict the Multiple's personality system. Psychother-
apists recognize that these metaphors and internal models are not exclusive. In other
words, families may exist within a particular tree structure. 87 Thus, more than one
of these internal models may be necessary to explain the personality system in a
particular Multiple.
d. Demeanor Exudes Self-Confidence and Credibility
Because a Multiple's demeanor exudes self-confidence and credibility due to
confabulation and memory hardening, a jury's observation alone will not uncover
579. The complexity of the Multiple's personality system is yet another reason why effective cross-
examination of a Multiple is impossible. The attorney will never have a complete understanding of the
Multiple's personality system. In addition, assuming the attorney conducting the cross-examination of
the Multiple has a limited knowledge of the Multiple's personality system, the average lay juror will
lack this knowledge. Therefore, the jury will neither appreciate nor understand the cross-examination,
thereby rendering it ineffective.






586. See id. at 210-ll.
587. See id. at 126.
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whether a Multiple's testimony is truthful and accurate.588 A Multiple may be
described as a super witness. Confabulation allows a Multiple to fill in memory gaps
with fantasy or suggestion, and because memory hardening allows him to believe
with extreme confidence that his memories are accurate, a Multiple will testify with
"unshakeable conviction" that his false memories are accurate.589 A juror observing
a Multiple's testimony will observe no outward sign, either verbal or nonverbal, that
would indicate that the testimony is unreliable.5" In contrast, when a non-Multiple
is testifying to inaccurate or uncertain memories, he will often communicate that his
testimony is unreliable by showing hesitancy, expressions of doubt, and body
language indicating a lack of certainty.59" ' Jurors often rely on these verbal and
nonverbal cues to assess the reliability of a witness's testimony." 2 Because these
cues are not present in a Multiple, the jurors' observations will be inadequate to
assure the reliability of the Multiple's testimony. Therefore, the jury will be misled
into believing that the Multiple's testimony is reliable based on the Multiple's self-
confidence and conviction, when in fact it may be unreliable confabulation.
C. Summation
Courts should adopt a per se exclusion for a Multiple's testimony. As discussed
above, a Multiple's testimony is testimony presented while under hypnosis.593 To
date, all courts have excluded, per se, testimony while under hypnosis. 4 Therefore,
a Multiple's testimony, as testimony presented while under hypnosis, is per se
inadmissible under the Frye test for scientific evidence. In addition, the Multiple's
testimony is per se inadmissible because it will always be more prejudicial than
probative. None of the traditional safeguards for reliability-the oath, cross-
examination, and the jury's observation-are effective to assure the reliability of a
Multiple's testimony."' 5 Courts that wish to proceed thoughtfully and cautiously will
recognize that a per se exclusion is the only way to assure that fairness is secured in
the judicial process, and that controversies are justly determined using only reliable
evidence.
588. See supra notes 466-483 and accompanying text.
589. See BLIss, supra note 12, at 78-81 (stating that a hypnotic experience is often indistinguishable
from reality).
590. See Diamond, supra note 359, at 338-39 (opining that hypnosis significantly adds to a witness's
confidence, removing traditional indicators of uncertainty upon which a jury relies).
591. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 14.01[1], at 14-2.
592. See id.
593. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
594. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
595. See supra notes 423-592 and accompanying text.
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. To the Practitioner
1. Request a Competency Hearing in Advance of Trial
Once counsel learns that a witness for the opposing party is a Multiple, counsel
should immediately request a competency hearing. A competency hearing is
necessary to preserve the issue for appeal. 96 Thus, even if the trial judge denies'the
request for a competency hearing, the issue of competency is raised and preserved for
appeal. If the trial judge denies a pretrial competency hearing, it would be wise for
counsel to demand a separate competency hearing each time a new alter emerges on
the stand.
2. Request that the Oath be Separately Administered to Each Alter
Personality Who Will Testify
The minimum threshold of competency requires that each witness be sworn and
understand the obligation to testify truthfully. It is counsel's responsibility to bring
any errors in the administration of the oath to the court's attention in a timely
fashion. 97 Counsel's failure to do so may result in a waiver of the error, precluding
him from raising the defects on appeal. 98 In addition, because many alters who
emerge could be children, it is necessary to assure that they understand the oath and
their duty to testify truthfully.
3. Make a Timely Objection on the Record and Move to Strike if the
Multiple is Permitted to Testify
"[E]rror cannot be predicated on a ruling admitting evidence unless 'a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record stating the specific ground of [the]
objection' . . . .""' Therefore, if the trial court determines that the Multiple is
permitted to testify, counsel should make timely and specific objections to the
596. See FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(1).
597. See id.
598. See id.
599. WEINSTEtN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 2.03[2][a], at 2-19 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(I)).
255
testimony, and move to strike the testimony in its entirety. In addition, if the court
allows the testimony, counsel may wish to question the court regarding the basis of
its ruling. "[Q]uestioning in response to an objection may clarify a situation that may
otherwise be unclear to the reviewing court."'
4. Make an Objection to the Multiple's Testimony on Hearsay Grounds
Whenever the host testifies regarding the experiences of an alter, or whenever
an alter testifies about the experiences of the host or another alter, the testimony is
arguably hearsay. 1 Therefore, if there is an attempt to introduce the testimony, a
prompt objection on hearsay grounds will preserve the issue for appeal.
.5. Make an Objection Based on Lack of Foundation
At least one court has held that an appropriate objection to hypnosis testimony
is an objection for lack of foundation.' A separate objection for lack of foundation
may be required because it has been held that an objection based on lack of reliability
is insufficient to cover inadequate foundation?
3
6. Bring a Motion to Suppress or a Motion in Limine to Exclude
Testimony From the Multiple
Counsel confronted with a Multiple should bring a motion to suppress or a
motion in limine to exclude the Multiple's testimony.' If the judge admits the
testimony, counsel should demand the opportunity to demonstrate at trial the possible
effects of self-hypnosis on the Multiple's testimony and its accuracy."
7. Request an Instruction to the Jury Regarding the Credibility of the
Multiple's Testimony
Counsel should request ajury instruction that thejury, in assessing the credibility
of the Multiple's testimony, may consider the fact that the Multiple's testimony is
600. Id. § 2.03[2][a], at 2-18 & n.4.
601. See Dorsey v. State, 426 S.E.2d 224, 227-28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (recognizing that a hearsay
objection to a Multiple's testimony would be valid if counsel was not given the opportunity to cross-
examine the specific alter who made the statement while in a dissociative state).
602. See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1978).
603. See id.
604. See Commonwealth v. Kater, 447 N.E.2d 1190, 1198 (Mass. 1983).
605. See id.
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hypnosis testimony.' Such an instruction is helpful because jurors are generally
unaware of the factors to consider when evaluating testimony.'
8. Request the Multiple's Psychological Records
Counsel challenging the reliability of a Multiple's testimony should request all
of the Multiple's psychological records."S The Multiple's psychological records are
helpful during both the pretrial and trial stages of litigation.609 At the pretrial stage,
the records help the attorney prepare for the Multiple's deposition. In addition, the
records are helpful for attacking the Multiple's credibility during a pretrial
competency hearing. At the trial stage, if the Multiple is permitted to testify, the
records are crucial during cross-examination. The expert hired to challenge the
Multiple's credibility will also need access to the Multiple's records. These records
will help the expert to identify the extent to which the therapy process itself may have
suggested or implanted memories and beliefs of prior life experiences. Also, these
records help the cross-examiner understand the internal model and make-up of the
Multiple's personality system.
9. Hire Expert(s) to Assist When Attacking the Reliability of the
Multiple's Testimony
Counsel will need expert assistance to attack the reliability of a Multiple's
testimony, both at the pretrial and trial stages, if the Multiple is permitted to testify.
Experts on both hypnosis and MPD are helpful. These experts can assist with pretrial
discovery, including the Multiple's deposition, as well as with competency hearings
and trial.
606. See id. (noting that if hypnosis testimony is admitted, counsel is entitled to a jury instruction
that in assessing the testimony's credibility they can consider the fact of hypnosis). Arguably, the same
jury instruction should be given in cases involving Multiples.
607. See WEiNsTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 2.07[3], at 2-58.
608. See Loftus, supra note 382, at 121. The practitioner should try to gain access to
[a]ny and all counseling and or therapeutic records pertaining to psychiatric, psychological,
therapeutic or any other mental health counseling of [the Multiple from the first session] to the
present, including but not limited to the following:
1. Any notes, correspondence or memoranda generated by [therapists];
2. Any audiotapes, videotapes, or drawings generated during counseling sessions or at the
request of [therapists];
3. The titles, authors, and publishers of any books, articles, videotapes provided [by therapists
to the Multiple] for reading and/or consultation.
Id.
609. See supra notes 528-35 and accompanying text.
10. Closely Supervise Expert Testimony in the Pretrial Stage
The Federal Rules of Evidence and their counterparts at the state level have
loosened the restrictions on the admissibility of expert testimony.610 Counsel should
do several things to supervise the preparation of expert testimony at the pretrial stage.
First, request "each party to identify the experts that it will use at trial and provide a
summary of those experts' expected testimony... ."6 Second, request the experts
to provide a glossary of the terms they will use at trial.6" 2 These definitions will assist
both the judge and the jury. If the experts can agree on their terminology, it will be
a great help to all involved. If they cannot agree, the list will be useful to avoid
confusion. Third, request joint pretrial meetings between the judge and key experts
for both sides, particularly if there is concern that an expert's testimony is inappropri-
ate.613 Fourth, request a list of the learned treatises upon which the experts will rely
on at trial.614 "A party intending to offer statistical data and analysis at trial should
be required to provide the underlying records from which the data [was] collected. 6 5
Counsel should be prepared well in advance of trial if he intends to object to the
expert's analysis.
11. If Necessary, Ask the Court to Appoint Expert Witnesses
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 authorizes the court to appoint expert witnesses.616
This rule applies in both civil and criminal cases. 617 A court-appointed expert may
be very helpful in assessing the competency of a Multiple because it is not
uncommon for the parties' experts to disagree, resulting in a "battle of the experts."6 '
An expert who is not hired by the parties is less likely to reach a biased conclusion
either for or against competency. 69 Additionally, a party-controlled expert often
leaves the court and trier of fact grappling with highly technical, diametrically
610. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 13.01, at 13-3 (noting that "[tihe drafters of the
Rules sought to eliminate many of the restrictions that had blocked the admission of useful expert
testimony").
611. Id. § 13.01, at 13-4.
612. See id. These terms will assist the reporters to accurately take testimony, can be used by the




616. Rule 706 states in pertinent part:
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause
why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and request the parties to submit nominations.
The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint
expert witnesses of its own selection.
FED. R. EvID. 706.
617. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 13.06[1], at 13-32.
618. See id. § 13.06[2], at 13-33.
619. See id.
[Vol. 27: 193, 2000] The Unreliability of Testimony from a Witness With MPD
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
opposed testimony.62°
12. Request the Court to Compel a Psychiatric Examination of the
Multiple
Counsel should request that the court order the Multiple to undergo a complete
and thorough psychiatric examination immediately upon learning that the case
involves a Multiple. The propriety of such an examination varies from state to state
and within the federal system. Courts' approaches to these examinations generally
fall into one of three categories. First, some courts take the position that a trial judge
has no inherent power to compel a psychiatric examination. 2' Other courts hold that
a defendant has an absolute right to an order compelling a psychiatric examination
of the complaining witness."' Finally, some courts have held that a trial judge has
discretion to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness where there
is a compelling reason.623 In federal courts, under the common law psychotherapist-
patient privilege, if the judge orders an examination of the Multiple's psychological
condition, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged unless the
judge orders otherwise.624
B. To the Court
1. Recognize that a Multiple's Testimony is a Particularly Unreliable
Form of Hypnosis Testimony
A Multiple's testimony is testimony presented while under hypnosis. 6' A
Multiple cannot differentiate between a true recollection, a fantasy, and memory that
620. See id. "By summoning its own witness where expert testimony is critical and the parties'
experts are at loggerheads, the court seeks to procure a high caliber, less venal expert, and to help the
court and parties reach a settlement or the jury to arrive at a sound verdict." Id.
621. See Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Necessity or Permissibility of Mental Examination to
Determine Competency or Credibility of Complainant in Sexual Offense Prosecution, 45 A.L.R.4TH
310, 324-26 (1987) (listing cases which hold that a trial judge has no inherent power to compel a
psychiatric examination).
622. See id. at 326 (providing cases which hold that the defendant has an absolute right to compel
a psychiatric examination).
623. See id. at 317-20 (supplying cases that hold that the court has discretionary power to order the
examination).
624. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 384, § 504.07[6], at 504-22 (discussing Supreme Court
Standard 504 which outlines the federal psychotherapist-patient privilege).
625. See supra notes 248-55 and accompanying text.
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is the product of suggestion.626 Courts should apply the hypnosis precedent which
universally recognizes that testimony given while under hypnosis should be excluded
per se.627
2. Per Se Exclude a Multiple's Testimony
Once courts recognize the inherent connection between unreliable hypnosis
testimony and a Multiple's testimony, courts should adopt a per se exclusion for a
Multiple's testimony. This can be accomplished by using either of two methods.
First, the court should exclude a Multiple's testimony by utilizing the Frye test.628
Second, the court should exclude per se a Multiple's testimony by ruling that it is
always more prejudicial than probative.629 A Multiple's testimony is always more
prejudicial than probative because the three traditional safeguards of reliability are
ineffective. 6 0 These traditional safeguards are the oath, cross-examination, and the
jury's ability to observe the witness firsthand.631  Either of these methods is a
sufficient basis for a court to adopt a per se exclusion of a Multiple's testimony.
3. Conduct a Pretrial Competency Hearing
Notwithstanding the presumption in favor of witness competency, trial judges
have an obligation to determine that the minimum standards of competency are met,
and are afforded considerable discretion when making the competency determination.
If the court does not per se exclude a Multiple's testimony, the court should order a
preliminary hearing to determine the Multiple's competency. The court's determina-
tion of competency will not be reversed on appeal unless it is an abuse of
discretion.632
4. Summing Up and Comment by the Court
If the court permits a Multiple to testify, the court should summarize and
comment on the Multiple's testimony. Supreme Court Standard 107, although not
a part of the Federal Rules of Evidence, authorizes the trial court to summarize and
comment on the evidence.633 Standard 107 states, in pertinent part:
626. See supra notes 449-65 and accompanying text.
627. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
628. See supra notes 414-22 and accompanying text.
629. See supra notes 423-595 and accompanying text.
630. See supra notes 423-592 and accompanying text.
631. See WEINSTEIN's MANUAL, supra note 402, § 14.01 [1 ], at 14-2; WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note
423, § 6011, at 124, 127.
632. See United States v. Gomez, 807 F.2d 1523, 1527 (10th Cir. 1986).
633. See WEINSTrEIN's MANuAL, supra note 402, § 2.07[1], at 2-53. "The text is consistent with
long-standing federal practice; it was not enacted by Congress, however, because of opposition by
attorneys trained in states where the trial judge does not have these powers." Id.
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After the close of the evidence and arguments of counsel, the judge may fairly and
impartially sum up the evidence and comment to the jury upon the weight of the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, if he also instructs the jury that they are
to determine for themselves the weight of the evidence and the credit to be given to the
witnesses and that they are not bound by the judge's summation or comment. 634
Standard 107 is consistent with longstanding federal practice. After closing
arguments by counsel, the judge is authorized to summarize the evidence for the
benefit of the jury. 635 "By retaining this traditional power, the federal judicial system
preserves one of the most effective tools the court has... to assist the jury in arriving
at a just verdict. '636 Although the court cannot tell the jury whether it believes a
particular witness is telling the truth,637 it is extremely helpful if the court advises the
jury as to what factors to consider when evaluating a witness's credibility.638 The
court also has the power to comment on the probative value of the proof offered by
the parties, and may give the jury an instruction limiting the application of evidence
to its proper scope.6 39 The jurors will be forced to assess the credibility of the
Multiple's testimony. Therefore, the court's summation should prove particularly
helpful, especially because the Multiple's credibility was probably the subject of
conflicting expert testimony.
IX. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, courts should acknowledge the connection between hypnosis
testimony and MPD testimony. MPD is a dissociative disorder perpetuated by the
abuse of self-hypnosis. Courts are in agreement that testimony presented while under
hypnosis is inadmissible per se. In addition, many courts per se exclude hypnotically
refreshed testimony. However, courts refuse to utilize this hypnosis precedent when
confronted with a Multiple's testimony. A Mutiple's testimony is testimony given
while under hypnosis.
634. Id. (emphasis added).
635. See id. § 2.07[2], at 2-54.
636. Id.
637. See, e.g., United States v. Anton, 597 F.2d 371,372 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that the trial court's
statement that it regarded the defendant as "devoid of credibility" deprived the defendant of his right
to have his credibility determined by the jury).
638. See WEINSTEIN'S MANUAL, supra note 402, § 2.07[3], at 2-58 (stating that "jurors are...
generally unaware of all the factors that should be taken into consideration [when] evaluating the
testimony").
639. See id. § 2.07[3], at 2-59 (explaining that "[t]he powero f a trial judge to comment on the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence is one of the tools for exercising substantial control over the admission
and presentation of evidence").
Moreover, because the primary mechanism of MPD is self-hypnosis, courts
should rule that a Multiple's testimony is particularly unreliable. A Multiple's
testimony should be excluded per se on two grounds. First, the Multiple's testimony
fails to meet the Frye standard for scientific evidence which should be applied to a
Multiple's testimony. Second, the probative value of a Multiple's testimony is
minimal at best, and the extreme prejudice that arises if a Multiple is permitted to
testify will always far outweigh the testimony's probative value. Either of these
grounds is sufficient to support a per se exclusion of a Multiple's testimony. The
best approach to assure that the truth is ascertained and proceedings justly determined
is for the courts to adopt a per se rule of exclusion for a Multiple's testimony.
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